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TAKING, TORT, OR CROWN RIGHT?:  THE CONFUSED EARLY HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT 
PATENT POLICY 
SEAN M. O’CONNOR 
ABSTRACT 
From the early days of the Republic, Congress and the federal courts grappled with the government’s 
rights to own or use patents it issued.  Courts rejected the British “Crown Rights” rule that allowed 
the sovereign to practice whatever patents it issued.  Instead, the federal government was 
conceptualized as a legal person on par with any other persons with regard to issued patents.  But, 
this simple rule presented challenges as complexities arose in three intertwined patent rights 
scenarios.  The first involved inventions by government employees.  The second revolved around 
government and government contractor use of patents held by private citizens.  And the third 
involved inventions by federal contractors and their employees arising under federal funding.  While 
these three scenarios seem quite distinct today, nineteenth and early twentieth century courts often 
treated them as overlapping.  The confusion was not resolved until the mid-twentieth century when 
a combination of executive branch and Congressional legislation set the roots of current government 
patent policy.  This Article reviews the history in detail and illuminates current government patent 
policy debate occurring through such seemingly diverse cases as Stanford v. Roche and Zoltek Corp. 
v. United States. 
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TAKING, TORT, OR CROWN RIGHT?:  THE CONFUSED EARLY HISTORY OF 
GOVERNMENT PATENT POLICY 
SEAN M. O’CONNOR* 
INTRODUCTION AND FIRST PRINCIPLES 
Outside of the federal government’s commonly understood role as an issuer of 
patents, it is also a significant owner of patents.  Further, it must frequently practice 
(or have practiced on its behalf) inventions claimed in private citizens’ patents.  On 
one level, it seems trivial that the government itself can own patents.  On another 
level, this is an odd proposition because, as the sovereign that is actually granting 
the patents in the first place, why does the government need to hold patents itself?  
After all, it should be able to simply exercise its eminent domain powers to practice 
any patent it wishes.1  In the alternative, it should be able to practice patents owned 
by others with impunity based on principles of sovereign immunity.2  However, 
because the patent grant has traditionally been viewed as not falling cleanly within 
the framework of either personal or real property,3 the legal implications of 
unauthorized government use of privately held patents have been likewise murky. 
Accordingly, the first consideration must be the nature of the patent grant in the 
United States to determine exactly what the government may be taking when it 
engages in unauthorized practice of a private party’s patent.  In particular, why 
would some limited, non-authorized government use of a citizen’s patented invention 
rise to the level of a taking when no property seems to have been taken?  After all, 
when one citizen engages in the unauthorized use of another citizen’s patented 
invention, this is deemed infringement, an action historically sounding in tort, not 
                                                                                                                                                
* © Sean M. O’Connor 2012.  Visiting Professor of Law (2012-2013), The George Washington 
University Law School; Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Law, Business & Entrepreneurship 
Program, University of Washington School of Law (soconnor@uw.edu). The Author wishes to thank 
Carly Chan and Rhys Lawson for invaluable research assistance on earlier drafts of this paper, the 
University of Washington School of Law and its Gallagher Law Library for generous research 
support, and the editors of The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law for their careful 
editing. All errors are the Author’s alone. 
1 See, e.g., Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U.S. 290, 308 (1912). (noting that, in 
light of the United States government’s eminent domain power, an “injunction could rightfully only 
have been made to operate until the United States had appropriated the right to use the patented 
inventions”). 
2 See, e.g., Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (explaining that 
28 U.S.C. § 1492(a) (2012) partially abrogates the U.S. government’s sovereign immunity for 
particular acts of patent infringement). 
3 DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 5–6 (Robert 
C. Clark, et al. eds., 3d ed. 2004) (explaining that patent and other intellectual property rights differ 
from traditional forms of property in the sense that knowledge and ideas are non-excludable and 
non-exhaustible). 
[12:145 2012] Taking, Tort, or Crown Right?:  The Confused  147 
 Early History of Government Patent Policy 
 
property.4  No misappropriation of property has occurred under the law, but rather 
an infringement of rights. 
This puzzle can be resolved by examining the exact nature of the patent grant in 
the United States.  Crucially, the core right granted with the patent is the “negative” 
right to exclude others from practicing the patentee’s invention as claimed in the 
patent.5  In detail, the patentee obtains: 
the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling 
the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into 
the United States, and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude 
others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United States, 
or importing into the United States, products made by that process . . . .6 
This is a negative right because it does not give the patentee any positive right 
to practice the patented technology herself.7  This makes sense for two reasons.  
First, we may not want the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) to issue positive 
rights to practice patented technologies because this could conflict with other 
government interests in regulating technologies, such as the requirement that the 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approve new pharmaceuticals before they 
may be distributed in the market.8  Second, the grant of a positive right to practice 
an invention would be somewhat redundant.9 
                                                                                                                                                
4 Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 168–69 (1894) (finding that a wrongful use of a 
patent action sounded in tort, and thus was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims); 
Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 33 (1931); Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety 
Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  
5 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012); WiAV Solutions LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d 1257, 1264 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (noting that under the Patent Act of 1952, “a patent grants the patentee the right to 
exclude others”).  
6 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). 
7 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 3, at 4.  
8 See, e.g., Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
9 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 3, at 5.  Consider the explanation of the patent right to exclude 
given by Giles S. Rich—later Judge Rich—while lecturing at Columbia Law School: 
 
Postulate that there is not now and never was a patent system.  A person makes 
an invention.  Assuming there is no law prohibiting it, can he make it?  Can he 
use it?  Can he sell it?  Yes.  Without a patent, he has all these rights.  Now let’s 
write down (on the blackboard) what the statute says the patent grants the 
inventor: 
 
A. THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO MAKE, USE, AND SELL 
 
and write under it what rights he had without a patent: 
 
B. THE       RIGHT TO MAKE, USE, AND SELL 
 
Now, let’s subtract B from A and see what the patent gave him   
  EXCLUSIVE 
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Thus, the “property” established by the issued patent is not the invention itself, 
but rather the exclusivity right.10  Contrast this with personal or real property rights 
to use, as well as exclude others from using, the property.11  While a “right to 
exclude” on its own may seem to be an odd sort of thing to consider property, consider 
that options on stock or commodities are property as well—they can be bought and 
sold—even though they are merely rights to take certain actions at a later date.  
Consequently, the patent res should be thought of as a legal right that can be bought 
and sold like other legal rights such as options or futures contracts. 
At the same time, this right to exclude represents the only real commercial value 
that an inventor can extract from her invention.  This is a different proposition from 
the obvious point that monopolies are almost always valuable to their holders.  The 
standard explanation for why intellectual property is different, and should be treated 
differently from other forms of property is summed up with the oft-cited Jefferson 
quote that “[h]e who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without 
lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening 
me.”12  This, however, seems to be a peculiar and overly limited view of inventions.  
Assuming the first person in the Jefferson quote is the inventor, there is a loss to the 
inventor when others use her invention.  While it is true that, on one level, many 
persons can simultaneously use and benefit from an invention, on another level, none 
has any more of an advantage over the others than he did before the use of the 
invention by all.  Accordingly, an invention’s real value to an inventor is the ability to 
use it exclusively, and in doing so gain a commercial advantage over her neighbors.13  
For example, an invention for a more efficient process for spinning wool will allow the 
                                                                                                                                                
Every business man knows what it means to “have the exclusive” on something.  
What he gets from the patent—and all he gets—is a right to exclude.  That’s the 
patent right. 
 
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Judge Rich’s lecture notes from Columbia Law School).  Judge 
Rich was a patent attorney before becoming one of the prime architects of the 1952 Patent Act (still 
the basis for the current patent law codified in the United States Code).  Id. at 24.  Later, Rich was 
appointed to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and then to the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit when that court was created in 1982.  Id. 
10 Id. at 5; Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citing Kaiser Aetna 
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). 
11 Chancellor Manor v. United States, 331 F.3d 891, 902 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that the Fifth 
Amendment protects interests in real property, including “the right to possess, use and dispose” of 
property, and that “property owners have the right to exclusive possession”). 
12 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), reprinted in THOMAS 
JEFFERSON:  WRITINGS 1291–92 (Merrill D. Peterson ed. 1984).  A more contemporary explanation is 
that because inventions are nonrivalrous (to use the economists’ term) and can be used by many 
simultaneously without lessening the value to each user, they differ from tangible forms of property 
such as cars and land that cannot be fully possessed and used simultaneously by more than one 
holder.  CHISUM ET AL., supra note 3, at 5–6. 
13 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 
266 (1977) (“The patent is a reward that enables the inventor to capture the returns from his 
investment in the invention, returns that would otherwise (absent secrecy) be subject to 
appropriation by others.”). 
[12:145 2012] Taking, Tort, or Crown Right?:  The Confused  149 
 Early History of Government Patent Policy 
 
inventor to produce more wool per cost expenditure than her neighbors, and thus, she 
may gain a decided market advantage over them. 
Of course, this sounds a lot like the rationale for trade secrets, which is 
implicitly embedded in the definition of a trade secret:  
“information . . . that . . . derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper 
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or 
use . . . .”14  Yet, this measure of value is also appropriate for patentable inventions, 
even though it does not appear in the definition of patents in a similar manner.  In 
fact, this reconceptualization of the value of inventions, patentable or otherwise, 
actually gives a clearer and more compelling justification for a patent system than 
the standard utilitarian or natural rights arguments,15 while only subtly, but 
importantly, differing from the utilitarian one.16  The theory proposed in this Article 
is most closely related to the dissemination incentive strain of utilitarian 
justifications:  The public’s proper concern is not so much that individuals will not 
invent absent a formal reward or incentive system such as patents, but rather that 
they will not distribute products embodying those inventions and may engage in 
costly measures to maintain the secrecy of the invention.17  But, if this is all the 
patent system is about, then why not pre-empt the trade secret system—as Congress 
has clearly chosen not to do18—and set up a reward/incentive system so that all 
commercially valuable inventions will be disseminated ultimately to the public? 
In contrast, the proposed theory reconciles this problem by arguing that the 
standard view of patentable inventions as somehow superior or more worthy than 
those protected as mere trade secrets gets things exactly backwards.  The 
dissemination problem is most acute for those valuable innovations that cannot be 
maintained as trade secrets absent substantial—and wasteful—efforts to disguise 
them in products or services distributed to the marketplace.  Thus, these sorts of 
innovations are less valuable to their inventors, absent a patent system, as a means 
for gaining economic advantage over one’s neighbors, and are then less likely to be 
used fully (or without wasteful exercises in subterfuge) than those that are 
protectable under the sort of trade secret and unfair competition law that 
significantly precedes formal patent systems.  Accordingly, the problem is not really 
about incentives to create or disclose, but rather simply incentive to use one’s 
inventions in the normal stream of commerce.19  The patent system, in this view, 
                                                                                                                                                
14 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985). 
15 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 3, at 6, 38–54 (discussing utilitarian and natural rights 
theories). 
16 See id. at 49–51. 
17 See id. at 68–70 (variously referring to the dissemination incentive as the “incentive to 
commercialize,” “incentive to invest,” “incentive to innovate,” and “prospect theory”).  
18 Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 155–56 (1989); Kewanee Oil Co. v. 
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974) (“Congress, by its silence over these many years, has seen the 
wisdom of allowing the States to enforce trade secret protection.”). 
19 See Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators:  Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 467 (2008) (discussing, in part, that innovators derive benefits from development and 
use of inventions).  Importantly, even if the system is best understood as an incentive to use one’s 
invention, in the United States we have refrained from taking the further step of requiring use or 
commercialization. 
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recognizes the value of invention to its inventor as residing in its exclusive use and 
establishes a legal fiction—the patent grant of exclusivity—to allow the patentee to 
hold a legal right to that exclusivity even for inventions that would be easily 
ascertainable when embodied in products placed in the stream of commerce.20 
In this way, the patent grant is not the unnatural, lottery-like or 
disproportionate reward/incentive structure that it is often held to be.  Rather, it 
simply creates a legal environment in which the commercial value to the inventor—
exclusivity—is maintained for a period of time by force of law so that the inventor 
can exploit her resource in a similar manner to other resources that are more 
“naturally” held in exclusive control, such as land or tangible objects.21  Further, this 
right to exclude does not carry with it a concomitant obligation to use or 
commercialize the invention both because there may be other legal or practical 
impediments to such use and because important economic values have been tied to 
the ability to time the distribution of one’s intellectual property products to events in 
the marketplace.22  Of course, the invention will pass into the public domain at the 
end of the patent term regardless of the inventor’s use, or lack thereof, during the 
patent term,23 so one could simply say that it is the inventor’s own loss if she does not 
exploit her invention at all during the exclusivity period. 
Admittedly, there is a bit of “unnaturalness” to the patent grant under this 
theory, in that it locks in exclusivity for some inventions, which, even if protectable 
as trade secrets, might still fall into the public domain—through disclosure or reverse 
engineering—in a time shorter than the patent term would be.24  But, this challenge 
                                                                                                                                                
20 Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1913) (discussing exclusivity as one of the patent 
rights).  
21 Kitch, supra note 13, at  266.  Edmund Kitch introduced the famous “prospect theory” of 
patents by analogizing the patent system to mineral prospecting, id. at 267–71, and the patent grant 
to the claim stake used by miners to mark off their prospecting area.  Id. at 271–74.   Like other 
valuable resource sources such as fresh water springs and oil deposits, mineral deposit areas are 
perfectly well understood to be susceptible to private ownership as demarcated by land ownership. 
Id.  Patent claims should be even less contentious as they do not remove anything from the 
commons (as arguably mining claim stakes do) and are restricted to new and nonobvious inventions 
that are not already part of the common knowledge.  35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2012).  Further, like 
mining stake claims, there is no guarantee that any value or profit will flow from patent grants—
patents rarely embody the entire product as sold to the public and, thus, require much development 
above and beyond the patent claims before revenues can flow.  Kitch, supra note 13, at 276–77; F. 
Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 
697, 707–12 (2001).  Thus, the strain of the dissemination incentive justification for patents that 
most closely aligns with the views of this Article, although not identically, is the commercialization 
theory as characterized by the view of patents as a coordinating mechanism to bring together all of 
the necessary players—not just inventors, but also venture capitalists, manufacturers, etc.—
involved in commercializing new technologies.  See Kieff, supra; CHISUM ET AL., supra note 3, at 68–
70; Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 24 J. PAT. 
OFF. SOC’Y 159, 177–80 (1942);  
22 See Herman v. Youngstown Car Mfg. Co., 191 F. 579, 584–85 (6th Cir. 1911). 
23 35 U.S.C. § 154.  At the same time, in the current environment where companies are 
building enormous patent portfolios for both offensive and defensive purposes—in some cases 
essentially warehousing many of these patents—one could argue that it is time to rethink the lack of 
a use or working requirement in the U.S. system. 
24 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (granting a patent term of twenty years from date on which the 
patent application was filed).  In fact, holding aside the formula for Coca-Cola, many trade secrets 
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is not fatal for the proposed theory.  Instead, it actually helps explain the limitations 
on patents.  First, we want to err on the side of not granting patents to things that 
are already known or obvious, and so we construct strict bars for novelty and 
nonobviousness.25  Second, we assume that secret inventions used in commerce will 
become known sooner or later,26 and thus, we limit the time period for the legal right 
to exclusivity.27 
Having now (re)established exactly what the patent grant is—simply the quasi-
contractual right to exclude others from making, using, or selling a certain 
invention—we can see that any unauthorized use of the invention has effectively 
destroyed the entirety of that right.28  Coupled with the establishment of this legal 
right as a res of property, similar to other contractual rights that can be traded, such 
as options of futures, the patent grant stands as a piece of private property that must 
be considered to have been taken, for Fifth Amendment purposes, whenever the 
government engages in any unauthorized use of the invention.29  This would include 
any “making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United 
States or importing the invention into the United States, and, if the invention is a 
process, of the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling 
throughout the United States, or importing into the United States, products made by 
that process . . . .”30  Even the narrowest use by the government without 
authorization should be deemed a taking because it destroys the only right the 
patentee has—the right to exclude others.  
Notwithstanding, many courts, including the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, have ruled that unauthorized use by the government does not constitute a 
“taking” in the traditional sense because of what is often called the “Government Use 
Statute,”31 which is a statutory provision authorizing such use with the only recourse 
for the patent owner being a suit for compensation in the Court of Federal Claims.32  
This statute is conceptually similar to the old “Crown Right” of the British 
government.33  The difference is that the U.S. government has to pay fair 
compensation for the use, whereas under the old British Crown Right, the British 
government had no such obligation.34  Throughout the nineteenth century, the 
                                                                                                                                                
do seem to find their way into the public domain sooner or later.  See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The 
Problematic Role of Criminal Law in Regulating Use of Information:  The Case of the Economic 
Espionage Act, 80 N.C. L. REV. 853, 868 (2002) (“The ‘leaky’ nature of trade secrets means that 
secret information often eventually enters the public domain . . . .”). 
25 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103(a). 
26 See Moohr, supra note 24. 
27 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012). 
28 35 U.S.C. § 271.  
29 See Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1114 (Ct. Cl. 1976).  
30 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). 
31 See, e.g., Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 627 F.3d 1309, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Leesona 
Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 979 (Ct. Cl. 1979). 
32 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). 
33 See United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262, 270 (1888).  
34 See Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 15 (1896).  Of note, the current statutory version of the 
British Crown Right does require fair compensation to the patent owner.  Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, 
§ 57A (U.K.).   
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Supreme Court consistently rejected the notion that the U.S. government had such a 
power to use a patent without compensation.35 
This rejection of the Crown Rights doctrine, originating in cases of government 
employee inventions, set off a cascade of other legal issues.  Did the government have 
a right to own, or even use, employee or military personnel inventions without an 
assignment or license?  Did the government have any rights to practice patented 
inventions held by purely private citizens?  If it did, could that right be extended to 
contractors working for the government?  Who should own inventions developed by 
such contractors on projects for the government?  And finally, should the 
determination of ownership rights as between the government and the contractor for 
federally funded inventions affect the ownership rights of inventors employed by the 
contractor?  These questions were all logical extensions of the thorny central issues of 
Crown Rights, compulsory licenses, and agency theories.36 
To a large extent, the three main issues—government employee invention 
use/title, government contractor and contractor employee invention use/title, and 
government use of private patents—were addressed by legislation, case law, and 
executive policy developments in the mid-twentieth century.37  But, not all the 
complications were resolved.  In fact, fairly fundamental issues were left open, such 
as how title or use rights of government contractor employee inventions should be 
secured, and whether fact patterns falling outside of the technical boundaries of the 
Government Use Statute would enable the patent owner to sue the government for a 
taking.38  These have come to the fore as of late and are being addressed, to some 
degree, by recent court decisions in Stanford v. Roche39 and Zoltek Corp. v. United 
States40  However, the unifying deeper questions of these seemingly disparate cases 
have not been tied together.  This Article, then, sets the missing groundwork to show 
that the original questions about how the government stood vis-a-vis its employees, 
                                                                                                                                                
35 See, e.g., Belknap, 161 U.S. at 15; United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883). 
36 See, e.g., Belknap, 161 U.S. at 15–22. 
37 See, e.g., Kessenich v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 528, 531–32 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Strategical 
Demolition Torpedo Co., Inc. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 264 (Ct. Cl. 1953); Stub v. United States, 
119 F. Supp. 206 (Ct. Cl. 1954); Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.); Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U.S. 
290, 305 (1912); Memorandum of October 10, 1963, 28 Fed. Reg. 10,943 (Oct. 12, 1963) [hereinafter 
Kennedy Patent Policy]. 
38 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. 
Ct. 2188, 2196 (2011). The Court explained that the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 did not automatically 
vest title in government contractor inventions to the U.S. government, and that “[n]owhere in the 
Act is title expressly vested in contractors or anyone else; nowhere in the Act are inventors expressly 
deprived of their interest in federally funded inventions.”  Id.  Instead, the statute provided that 
“contractors may ‘elect to retain title to any subject invention.’”  Id.  As for the issue of whether a 
patent owner may sue the government for a taking for fact patterns outside the Government Use 
Statue, the court in Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2012), 
recounted the “saga of Zoltek Corporation” and the considerable confusion regarding the proper 
forum for suit when a private patent holder’s rights have allegedly been infringed in a foreign 
jurisdiction by a U.S. government contractor who then imports the allegedly infringing product back 
into the United States for sale and use. 
39 Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188 
(2011). 
40 Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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contractors, and the patent system itself are still at issue in these current cases.  
Part I establishes the context and details of the early judicial debates over whether 
government use of patented inventions without an express license or assignment was 
a taking, tort, quasi or implied contact, or form of Crown Right.  Part II traces the 
statutory and judicial attempts at resolving these issues in the pre-war ,early 
twentieth century.  Part III then outlines, in brief, the post-war, mid-twentieth 
century statutory and executive branch policies that form the basis for modern 
government patent policy. 
I. THE TORT, TAKING, AND CROWN RIGHT DEBATES IN THE EARLY U.S. PATENT SYSTEM 
A look back at the early history of the patent system and the government’s use of 
patented technologies gives concrete examples and support to the foregoing 
theorizing, even as it adds a new layer of complexity.  The Patent Act of 1790, the 
first federal patent statute, was silent as to whether patents were property, but also 
seemed to give both negative and positive rights to the patented invention.41  The 
penalties for unauthorized infringement under this Act were forfeiture of the 
infringing goods and damages.42  The 1790 Act was quickly repealed and replaced by 
the Patent Act of 1793,43 which primarily switched the U.S. patent system from one 
based on intensive examination—by a panel consisting of the Secretary of State, 
Secretary of the Department of War, and the Attorney General—to one based merely 
upon registration with the Secretary of State.44  This Act retained the positive and 
negative rights grant of the 1790 Act,45 but also established the possibility of blocking 
improvement patents,46 and, arguably, established an early version of the doctrine of 
equivalents.47  Of particular interest for this Article, the 1793 Act also expressly 
authorized the assignability of patents with a requirement for recordation with the 
Secretary of State.48 
                                                                                                                                                
41 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109 (granting to inventors “for any term not 
exceeding fourteen years, the sole and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using and 
vending to others to be used, the said invention or discovery”).  It is not clear whether the 
implications of this positive grant—or “liberty”—to practice the invention was understood to then 
preempt or supersede any other legal limitations on such practice.  However, see infra for a 
discussion of whether this and subsequent Acts with similar language were actually interpreted to 
give a positive right to practice the invention, rather than solely the negative right as is clearly the 
case under the current law. 
42 Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 111. 
43 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318–21. 
44 Compare Patent Act of 1790 ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat 109, 109, with Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 
Stat 318, 318–21. 
45 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318–21. 
46 Id. § 2, 1 Stat. at 321 (“That any person, who shall have discovered an improvement in the 
principle of any machine, or in the process of any composition of matter, which shall have been 
patented, and shall have obtained a patent for such improvement, he shall not be at liberty to make, 
use or vend the original discovery, nor shall the first inventor be at liberty to use the 
improvement . . . .”).   
47 Id. (“And it is hereby enacted and declared, that simply changing the form or the proportions 
of any machine, or composition of matter, in any degree, shall not be deemed a discovery.”). 
48 Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 322. 
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At the same time, it seems clear that only natural persons could obtain patents 
as inventors under both the 1790 and 1793 Acts, based on the requirements that the 
patent petitioner (today called the applicant) be the original and true inventor and 
the pronoun references to “he” or “they,” but never “it” for such petitioners.49  Thus, 
there was not then, and is not now, the possibility for “corporate inventors” in the 
same way that there can be “corporate authors” under the work for hire doctrine of 
the Copyright Act.50  The 1793 Act also restricted remedies for infringement to 
damages, not including forfeiture of infringing goods, but raised damages to “a sum, 
that shall be at least equal to three times the price, for which the patentee has 
usually sold or licensed to other persons, the use of the said invention[.]”51 
Neither the 1790 nor 1793 Acts made any provision regarding government use of 
privately owned patents.52  Further, no cases seem to have arisen where a patentee 
sued the federal government for unauthorized use of his/her patents.  The earliest, 
accessible reference to any government acquisition of patent rights is an 1812 act of 
Congress “to purchase of Winslow Lewis, his patent right to the new and improved 
method of lighting Lighthouses, and for other purposes.”53  This is a fascinating piece 
of legislation for a few reasons:  first, that it would take an act of Congress, albeit a 
private act, just for the government to avail itself of someone’s patent rights; second, 
that it includes authorization to contract with Lewis to run the upkeep operation as 
well;54 and third that $60,000—in 1812—was appropriated by Congress for this 
plan.55  While not conclusive evidence, this act seems to justify an inference that the 
U.S. government did not believe that it could simply take a license, under an eminent 
domain theory or otherwise, to a private citizen’s patent.  Instead, it seemed to 
simply approach the situation as if it were any other private party that would need to 
negotiate with the patentee to obtain any rights to practice the invention. 
The next major patent legislation was the Patent Act of 1836,56 which repealed 
and replaced the 1793 Act.57  The 1836 Act reinstated the examination system (but 
through a system of clerks this time),58 and allowed a court to impose a range of 
damages starting at the actual amount and proceeding up to a maximum of treble 
damages.59  But, it seemed to have had no effect on the federal government’s ability, 
or perception of its ability, to take unauthorized licenses, even for munitions related 
patents.  For example, Congress passed legislation on the same day that it passed the 
1836 Act authorizing a purchase of two patents from one Captain William H. Bell: 
the first for “a machine for elevating heavy cannon,” and the second for “a traverse 
                                                                                                                                                
49 Id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 318–21. 
50 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).  Copyright law still allows for the separation of owners and 
authors regarding copyrights, id. § 201(d), just as patent law provides for a distinction between 
inventors and owners under the assignment doctrine.  35 U.S.C. § 261. 
51 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322. 
52 Patent Act of 1790 ch. 7, 1 Stat 109, 109–12; Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, 318–23. 
53 Act of March 2, 1812, ch. 34, 2 Stat. 691, 691. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. § 2. 
56 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, 117–25. 
57 Id. § 21, 5 Stat. at 125. 
58 Id. § 2, 5 Stat. at 118. 
59 Id. § 14, 5 Stat. at 123. 
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board for pointing cannon.”60  Congress also wisely included a right for the U.S. to 
use “every improvement that has been made by said Bell on the said inventions, 
since patenting the same . . . .”61  The grand total for this purchase was to be 
$20,000.62  
Likewise, ten years later, the federal government seems to have still been 
relying on this cumbersome method to acquire rights to privately held patents.63  On 
August 8, 1846 Congress enacted legislation: 
 
That the Secretary of the Navy be, and he is hereby, authorized to 
purchase of Mrs. Ann Mix, widow of M. P. Mix, late master 
commandant in the navy, the unlimited power to use a machine 
called a “manger-stopper,” in all ships of war or other vessels 
belonging to the United States:  Provided, An assignment thereof can 
be obtained at a cost not exceeding three thousand dollars, which sum 
is hereby appropriated, to be paid out of any money in the treasury 
not otherwise appropriated.64 
 
Another fascinating part of these last two Congressional appropriations is that both 
seem to be authorizing purchases of patents obtained by military men, and in the last 
case, the patent was for naval technology likely developed by Mr. Mix while still 
employed by the U.S. Navy.65  If this is true, then it would appear that government 
agencies such as the Navy, under the then Department of War, were not even 
requiring the assignment of patentable inventions by employees.66  Yet, at the same 
time, the government was finding that it needed some of these patented 
technologies—both those developed completely by outsiders, as well as those invented 
and patented by the government’s own employees.67 
Nearly a decade later, Congress passed the first act creating the Court of Claims 
(the predecessor to the Court of Federal Claims) to “hear and determine all claims 
founded upon any law of Congress, or upon any regulation of an executive 
department, or upon any contract, express or implied, with the government of the 
United States . . . .”68  In 1863, the Court of Claims’ authority was extended to 
include “all set-offs, counter-claims, claims for damages, whether liquidated or 
unliquidated, or other demands whatsoever, on the part of the government, against 
any person making claim against the government in said court.”69 
                                                                                                                                                
60 Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 360, 5 Stat. 126, 126. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Act of Aug. 8, 1846, ch. 169, 9 Stat. 82, 82. 
64 Id. 
65 Id.  
66 Id.  Of course, it is possible that Mr. Mix had in fact left the service before inventing and 
patenting the manger-stopper, or that he had not developed it as part of his regular duties.  
67 See e.g., Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 360, 5 Stat. 126; Act of Aug. 8, 1846, ch. 169, 9 Stat. 82.  
68 See Clyde v. United States, 80 U.S. 38, 39 (1871) (quoting Patent Act of 1855, ch. 122, 10 
Stat. 612, 612). 
69 See Ex parte Zellner, 76 U.S. 244, 244 (1869) (quoting Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 3, 12 
Stat. 765, 765). 
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In that same year, what appears to be the first case brought against the United 
States for patent infringement was brought before the Court of Claims.70  In Pitcher 
v. United States (“Pitcher’s Case”),71 the warden of the U.S. penitentiary for the 
District of Columbia had inmates using the patented broom making machine of one 
Spencer Rowe to manufacture brooms, which were then sold with the proceeds going 
to the maintenance and support of the penitentiary.72  While the warden had duly 
entered into an agreement with Rowe to erect and operate them with inmate labor, 
Rowe had earlier assigned all his interest in the patent to one John Fox, who in turn 
had assigned it to C. A. Pitcher, the claimant.73  Pitcher then based his claim against 
the U.S. on an interesting twist, necessitated by the limited jurisdiction of the Court 
of Claims:  Even though the same fact pattern as between two private individuals 
would lead only to a tort claim—or “action on the case”74—of patent infringement, the 
United States is a body politic that is incapable of committing tortious acts.  
Therefore, it must enter into an implied contract with patent holders when it uses 
their patents without authorization.75  Consequently, the patent owner should be 
allowed to waive the tort and bring an action based on assumpsit and the implied 
contract.76  This, of course, then allows the patent owner to bring the claim within 
the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.  For good measure, Pitcher also added a 
takings claim and argued that this too gave rise to an implied contract to compensate 
him for the taking.77 
The court was unimpressed by these arguments, and denied that it had 
jurisdiction to hear the case.78  First, it rejected the takings claim because of both the 
nature of the thing alleged to have been taken and the manner in which it occurred.79  
As to the latter,  “[w]e cannot believe that the framers of this clause intended that 
every subordinate officer or petty agent of the United States might undertake to 
decide for himself when the exigency has occurred, or the necessity exists, for the 
seizure and appropriation of the property of the citizen.”80  This argument that there 
                                                                                                                                                
70 Pitcher v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 7 (1863). Of course, the basis for such suits may have 
existed much earlier, but perhaps owing simply to a lack of a proper forum, on the one hand, and 
sovereign immunity principles, on the other, any earlier claims against the U.S. may simply have 
not been able to be heard in any court of law. 
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 7–8. 
73 Id. at 7. 
74 Act of July. 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (establishing that “damages may be 
recovered by action on the case in any court of competent jurisdiction”). 
75 Pitcher, 1 Ct. Cl. at 8–9.  While this appears to have been a novel argument in this case, it 
was formally stated as a point of law, albeit as between a citizen of one country and agents of a 
government of another, by the Court of Claims two years later in Straughan v. United States, 1 Ct. 
Cl. 324 (1865).  The Court plainly stated that “[t]here is no such thing as a tort by a government 
against an individual.”  Id. at 328.  It went on to state that “[a]s between a citizen and his own 
government, acts which between private persons would be torts are to be deemed implied contracts 
founded on the right of eminent domain, or else acts unavoidable, and necessary for the public 
welfare, but never acts founded upon a wrongful or malicious intent.”  Id. at 328–29. 
76 Pitcher, 1 Ct. Cl. at 8–9. 
77 Id. at 9. 
78 Id.  
79 Id. 
80 Id.  
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needs to be a suitably high or formal level of authorization for a taking to be held to 
have occurred reappears in later cases of unauthorized patent use by the government 
throughout the 1800s.81  Where such authorization does not exist, then the action by 
the government agent or officer “is a simple trespass, for which he is amenable to the 
law, . . . .”82  The court also asserted that there just “was no seizure or taking of any 
tangible property belonging to the claimant; at most it was a mistaken and 
unauthorized use of a machine which he had an exclusive right to make, use, and 
vend.”83  “It was the disturbance or infringement of his right, instead of the caption of 
his property.” 84 
Second, the court pointed out that the patent law itself prescribes both the form 
of action and proper forums for patent owners seeking remedy for unauthorized use 
of their patents.85  Neither of these had been availed of by the claimant in this case.  
Finally, the court dispensed of the implied contact argument, at least based on the 
facts of the case:   
We will not affirm that no case can arise where this principle would be 
sustained; but we think we are safe in saying that the doctrine of implied 
contract does not arise in any case out of the acts of an agent who has no 
power or authority to make an express one.86   
However, there was one additional wrinkle asserted by the claimant:  
[I]t is contended that [the implied contract] arises not so much from the 
wrongful acts of the agents or officers of the United States as from the 
receipt of the proceeds or profits of the use of the machine; and that having 
received these profits from the wrongful use of the machine, the claimant 
may waive the tort, and sue as for money had and received to his use.87 
The court accepted that there were cases where tortious conversion of property 
occurred and the owner was then able to waive the tort and bring an action in 
indebitadus assumpsit to recover the money “had and received” by the tortious 
actions.88  But, it stated that in the case of a patented machine, “it is the machine 
itself and not its product that is protected by the letters patent.”89  Thus, the brooms 
manufactured by the machines “were simply and exclusively the property of the 
United States” and consequently the injury sustained by the claimant “was not the 
sale and conversion of his brooms, but the unauthorized use of his invention in 
making them.”90  Again, the court called attention to the type of action and forums 
                                                                                                                                                
81 See infra. 
82 Pitcher v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 7, 9 (1863). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 9. 
85 Id. at 10. 
86 Id. at 11. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
90 Id. at 11–12. 
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prescribed by the patent statute, and ultimately held that its jurisdiction did not 
extend to this case.91 
What is not fully explored in Pitcher’s Case is whether the warden believed that 
he was acting under proper authorization of the patent owner when he installed and 
used the broom machines under contract with the original patentee, Rowe.  If so, 
then this would not be the best fact pattern for determining the liability of the 
government for intentional unauthorized use of patents, but rather only a test of 
accidental or negligent unauthorized use.  Pitcher’s Case does, however, lay some 
groundwork for the substantial problem of determining damages when the 
government infringes a patent because the government is usually perceived as not 
acting as a commercial entity and, so, measures such as profits are difficult to assess. 
A few years after Pitcher’s Case, Burns v. United States (“Burn’s Case”)92 
affirmed that patent owners’ licenses to the government are valid and may not be 
disregarded by the government.93  In particular, Captain (later Major) Burns received 
an assignment of one-half interest in a patent for a conical tent from the patentee, 
one Major Sibley.94  Both were then officers in the U.S. Army, but Sibley afterwards 
defected and joined the Confederate Army as the Civil War ensued.95  While still 
commissioned with the U.S. Army, Sibley negotiated a license with the Army to 
produce the patented tents upon royalties of $5 per tent.96  After he defected, the 
Army determined that Major Burns should still be paid one-half of this royalty, even 
as it ceased paying Sibley.97  After paying Burns this partial royalty on a number of 
tents, the Army began withholding payments based on an interpretation of Army 
Regulation 1002, which forbade military officers and agents from purchasing or 
contracting for military goods and services with other military officers and agents.98  
Clearly, 1002 intended to limit favoritism and cronyism in military procurement, but 
the court recognized that the military would almost certainly need to contract 
occasionally with its officers and agents in the context of military procurement.99  
The court held that the Secretary of War was a civilian officer rather than a military 
officer, and thus, contracts he approved fell outside of 1002.100  Because the Secretary 
of War approved Sibley’s original license, it too fell outside of 1002.101 
At the same time, the Army continued making and using the patented tents.  
The court held that the former’s withholding of royalty payments to Burns was 
                                                                                                                                                
91 Id. at 12.  The court does state in dicta that the remedies available under the patent statute 
are “appropriate and ample, and those courts open to the claimant . . . .”  Id.  But, the availability of 
the federal circuit courts for patent infringement actions against government agents and officers 
who acted within their official duties is in fact challenged in the first case in which it arises.  See 
infra. 
92 Burns v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 113 (1868). 
93 Id. at 116. 




98 Id. at 115. 
99 Id.  
100 Id.  
101 Id.  
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insufficient grounds to find that the Army had terminated the license.102  This last 
point was crucial because it kept the matter within the context of an express 
contract, actionable in the Court of Claims.  By contrast, the Army had argued that it 
had terminated the contract, and so any further making or using of the patented tent 
was a tortious activity outside of the court’s jurisdiction.103  However, the court 
strongly suggested that it should not be presumed that the Secretary “intended to 
violate the law and disregard the rights secured by the patent, [even while] it is 
certain that he could not commit the United States to any such wrongful 
procedure.”104  The Secretary must not have been too pleased with the Army’s 
attempt to paint him as a tortfeasor.  Alternatively, based on the court’s own 
comments in Pitcher’s Case, would not the Secretary have been a high enough 
authority in the government to direct a taking of the patent?  Whether it was 
intentional or not, the court seemed to duck this explanation for the Secretary’s 
actions.105 
While the case was on appeal to the Supreme Court, Congress had already 
decided it was time to compile the sundry amendments to the Patent Act of 1836 that 
had been accumulating.106  Thus, the Patent Act was once again repealed and 
replaced by the Patent Act of 1870.107  For our purposes, the two major changes were 
to the patent grant itself, and the explicit authorization of injunctive relief in 
appropriate cases of infringement.  The patent grant language in the 1870 Act 
dropped the confusing reference to “liberties” in earlier Acts that seemed to give a 
positive right to practice the invention.108  The new language instead established a 
“grant to the patentee, . . . for the term of seventeen years, of the exclusive right to 
make, use, and vend the said invention or discovery . . . .”109  This language was still 
not as crisp on the nature of the patent grant as the 1952 Act, but it certainly seems 
closer to, and was interpreted as, simply granting a right to exclude.110  For example, 
                                                                                                                                                
102 Id. at 116.  
103 Id. at 126. 
104 Id.  The court continued to offer an alternate explanation:  the Secretary had merely ceased 
the payments in case the courts determined that the contract with Sibley was invalid under the 
Regulation; payment could always be made later upon proper interpretation of the Regulation by the 
courts.  Id. 
105 Id.  But neither party seemed to raise the issue anyway, likely with good reason as it would 
not have helped either’s case. 
106 Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 198–217. 
107 Id. 
108 Id.; see also Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852) (suggesting that, even under the 
Patent Act of 1836, the patentee did not have a liberty to use the patent, but rather only to exclude 
others).  The Supreme Court considered the nature of the patent grant under the 1836 Act, as 
amended, and gave a description of that grant that is very much in line with Judge Rich’s analysis 
of the contemporary patent right:  “The franchise which the patent grants, consists altogether in the 
right to exclude every one from making, using, or vending the thing patented, without the 
permission of the patentee.  That is all that he obtains by the patent.”  Id.   Accordingly, even the 
earlier patent acts may not have in fact been granting positive rights to practice the invention. 
109 Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 22, 16 Stat. 198, 201. 
110 Compare Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 22, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (granting “the exclusive right to 
make, use, and vend the said invention”), with Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 154, 66 
Stat. 792, 804 (granting “the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention”).  
Judge (then attorney) Rich in fact seems to have been using the language of the 1870 Act—which 
 
[12:145 2012] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 160 
 
the use of a conjunction makes it sound as if the exclusive right was just directed to 
the exercise of all three tasks together—making, using, and selling—and not on each 
task as performed separately.111  The 1952 Act fixed this by changing the list to a 
disjunctive one.112 
Therefore, by 1870 the clear contours of the modern patent grant were firmly 
established—although there was still no explicit reference to the property status of 
patents—and remedies for both damages and injunctions were available.113  At the 
same time, questions about the status of patents arising from government activities 
as well as government use of the same, or even of purely private sector derived 
patents, were increasing.114  This increase may have been based, in part, on the 
increasing pace of technological innovation generally in the United States, including 
the particular drive for war related technology associated with the Civil War’s 
subsequent reputation as the first modern war.115 
In December of that same year, the Supreme Court issued decisions in both 
United States v. Burns116 and Seymour v. Osborne.117  Affirming the Court of Claims 
in Burns, the Supreme Court added an interesting extra fillip.  In explaining its 
affirmance of the lower court’s ruling that the War Department, under the 
Secretary’s authorization, can enter into contracts with servicemen notwithstanding 
Regulation 1002, the Court commented on the ability of such servicemen to obtain 
patents on military equipment: 
If an officer in the military service, not specially employed to make 
experiments with a view to suggest improvements, devises a new and 
valuable improvement in arms, tents, or any other kind of war material, he 
is entitled to the benefit of it, and to letters-patent for the improvement 
from the United States, equally with any other citizen not engaged in such 
service; and the government cannot, after the patent is issued, make use of 
the improvement any more than a private individual, without license of the 
inventor or making compensation to him.118 
                                                                                                                                                
largely remained in place until the 1952 Act repealed and replaced it—in his Columbia lecture 
notes.  See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 3, at 5. 
111 Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230 § 22, 16 Stat. 198, 201. 
112 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 154, 66 Stat. 792, 804 (“Every patent shall 
contain . . . a grant . . . for the term of seventeen years, of the right to exclude others from making, 
using, or selling the invention . . . .”). 
113 Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64, 68–69 (1876) (explaining the remedies that existed in 
equity and damages prior to the Patent Act of 1870). 
114 Most notably, questions of whether use of patents by the government were subject to 
compensation under the Takings Clause.  Accord Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225, 234–35 (1876) 
(concluding that patents are property for the purpose of Takings Clause analysis); McKeever v. 
United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 396, 422 (1878) (quoting Cammeyer). 
115 ANDREW P. MORRISS & CRAIG ALLEN NARD, INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE & INTEREST GROUPS IN 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PATENT LAW:  1790-1870, at 65 (2008).  
116 United States v. Burns, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 246, 246 (1870). 
117 Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 516 (1870). 
118 Burns, 79 U.S. at 252 (emphasis added). 
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This comment would later be cited for the proposition that the United States would 
not follow the English precedent of a Crown Right to practice all patents issued in 
that country.119  At the same time, it left open the government’s right to contract with 
employees to invent and then assign those inventions to the government, just as was 
the practice developing in the private sector.120  In Seymour, Justice Clifford, writing 
for the majority, established the patent grant as a property right, notwithstanding 
that the Patent Act of 1870 did not expressly support this:  “Inventions secured by 
letters patent are property in the holder of the patent, and as such are as much 
entitled to protection as any other property, consisting of a franchise, during the term 
for which the franchise or the exclusive right is granted.”121  
 The consequence of this propertization of the patent grant for government use of 
patented inventions would not become fully clear until six years later.  Justice 
Clifford, sitting as Circuit Justice for the District of Massachusetts in Brady v. 
Atlantic Works, rejected in dicta any right for the government to use patented 
inventions without authorization or compensation except in the most dire of 
circumstances.122  The issue was again, whether the government had any sort of 
Crown Right to use a patented invention, but in this case, the question extended to a 
contractor of the government.123  Atlantic Works was building ships for the 
                                                                                                                                                
119 See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262, 270 (1888) (“It was . . . doubted whether the 
government might not be entitled to the use and benefit of every patented invention, by analogy to 
the English law, which reserves this right to the crown.  But that notion no longer exists.  It was 
ignored in the Case of Burns.”). 
120 Id.  Oddly though, the related doctrine of “shop rights”, or nonexclusive licenses implied to 
have been granted to employers where employees use their facilities to invent, was not mentioned as 
an alternate possible justification for a U.S. government right to practice Sibley’s patent without 
compensation (to Burns), even though a case involving a similar circumstance in the private sector 
had already been upheld in an 1843 Supreme Court decision.  In McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202 
(1843), the defendants had employed James Harley in their foundry where he subsequently invented 
an improved machine for manufacturing metal rollers.  Id. at 205.  Harley received a raise in pay for 
these efforts and allowed his employer to use the modified machines – indeed the machines appear 
to have been made only because of the defendant’s contribution of resources for the purpose.  Id.  
Harley at one point suggested that he would patent the invention if the defendants would then 
purchase it from him, but they declined.  Id.  He later patented the improvement anyway, and 
assigned it to the plaintiffs in this case instead.  Id.  Afterwards, Harley left the defendants’ employ 
because of a disagreement on a different matter, while the defendants continued using his patented 
improved machines.  Id.  Plaintiffs then brought a patent infringement action in the Circuit Court of 
the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania, which found for the defendants on an 
implied license theory.  Id. at 205–6. The Supreme Court heard the case on a writ of error and 
affirmed the lower court’s decision.  Id. at 211.  But whereas the Circuit Court only granted a 
nonexclusive license to the defendants, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that the facts of the 
case could have supported a finding that enough public use of the improved machines had occurred 
before the patent application such that the patent should be held invalid.  Id. at 208.  However, the 
court was of course restrained by the record developed by the lower courts, and the arguments of the 
parties therein, and could only affirm the finding of an implied license.  See id.  It is interesting that 
the Court nonetheless appeared to consider the nonexclusive “shop right” type of license to be a 
variation on the public use grounds for denying or invalidating a patent.  
121 Seymour, 78 U.S. at 533. 
122 Brady v. Atl. Works, 3 F. Cas. 1190, 1192 (C.C.D. Ma. 1876) (No. 1794) rev’d on other 
grounds, 107 U.S. 192 (1883). 
123 Id. at 1193. 
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government and, in doing so, allegedly infringing the patent of Brady.124  One of its 
defenses was that it was acting as the “mere instrument” of the government as the 
latter endeavored to build ships for its navy.125  This may have been the first time 
that a contractor expressly sought to clothe itself as an agent of the government for 
purposes of shielding itself from infringement liability.  But, the court did not reach 
that issue, as it rejected Atlantic Works’ threshold argument that the government 
had reserved for itself a kind of Crown Right in any event.126  Justice Clifford 
expressly rejected the applicability of continuing British case law on this matter—
specifically Feather v. Queen.127  Implicitly adopting the position that patents are not 
any species of monopoly in the United States, he stated that “[p]atents in that 
country are monopolies, granted by the sovereign, and may be granted or refused in 
the royal discretion.”128  By contrast, “[p]ower to legislate upon the subject in this 
country is conferred upon congress by the constitution, by securing for limited 
periods to inventors the exclusive rights to their discoveries.”129  Under the Patent 
Act of 1870, the use of “[l]anguage so explicit and unambiguous admits of no 
exception, even if it would be competent for congress to reserve such a right to the 
government.”130  The opinion cited both Burns and the Patent Act of 1870 in support 
of these propositions.  It did, however, leave open the possibility for a limited 
sovereign power to use a privately held patent with neither authority nor 
compensation “in cases of extreme necessity, in time of war, and of immediate and 
impending public danger.”131  But, none of those scenarios were found to apply in the 
Brady facts,132 despite Atlantic Works’ arguments that this was essentially a suit 
against the government of the kind that could stop the operations of the government 
in times of both war and peace.133 
Also in 1876, Justice Clifford wrote the opinion for the Supreme Court in 
Cammeyer v. Newton.134  Nominally, like Brady, this appeared to be an infringement 
case between private parties in which one of the defenses was that the work had been 
done for the government.  However, in this case, it was literally true as Newton and 
the other respondents were engineers directly employed by the government.135  While 
the Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling in favor of the defendants, it was on the 
grounds of no infringement.136  Yet in dicta, Justice Clifford set the tone of cases to 
come in which government employees would find themselves potentially liable to 
damages or injunctions for infringing activities done in the course of their 
employment: 
                                                                                                                                                
124 Id. at 1191. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 1194. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. (emphasis added). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 1192. 
132 Id. at 1194. 
133 Id. at 1191. 
134 Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225 (1876). 
135 Id. at 234. 
136 Id. at 236–38. 
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Public employment is no defence to the employé for having converted the 
private property of another to the public use without his consent and 
without just compensation.  Private property, the Constitution provides, 
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; and it is clear 
that that provision is as applicable to the government as to individuals, 
except in cases of extreme necessity in time of war and of immediate and 
impending public danger. 
 . . . .  
Agents of the public have no more right to take such private property than 
other individuals under that provision, as it contains no exception 
warranting any such invasion of the private rights of individuals.  
Conclusive support to that proposition is found in a recent decision of this 
court, in which it is held that the government cannot, after the patent is 
issued, make use of the improvement any more than a private individual, 
without license of the inventor or making him compensation.137  
Two years later, yet another similar case came in front of the Court of Claims in 
McKeever v. United States.138  This time, however, the patentee plaintiff was a 
government employee, specifically a first lieutenant in the Second U.S. Infantry who 
had invented a new kind of bullet cartridge box for soldiers to wear.139  So, this case 
once again combined the question of whether the government should own or have 
rights to inventions of its employees, as the government appears to have believed 
leading up to this case,140 with the question of whether the government has any kind 
of Crown Right, which the government then specifically argued in the case.141  The 
government relied on the British cases of Feather v. The Queen142 and Dixon v. The 
                                                                                                                                                
137 Id. at 234–35. (citations omitted).  The potential carve out for “cases of extreme necessity in 
time of war and of immediate and impending public danger” was almost certainly a nod to United 
States v. Russell.  80 U.S. 623 (1871).  In that case, the Supreme Court affirmed a Court of Claims 
holding that fair compensation was warranted where military officers commandeered steamships for 
emergency purposes on the Mississippi River during the Civil War.  Id. at 629.  The Court found 
that the crews of the steamships had assented, creating an implied contract which brought the 
matter properly into the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, and not some kind of “appropriation” 
taking as would be outside that jurisdiction.  Id. at 630.  The case would be cited in later decisions 
finding implied licenses for government use of patented inventions, even in the absence of an 
express contract.  See, e.g., United States v. Berdan Firearms Mfg. Co., 156 U.S. 552, 569 (1895). 
138 McKeever v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 396 (1878).  The case is reported to have been 
affirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal in the Supreme Court’s decision in Russell v. United 
States, 182 U.S. 516, 531 (1901) (“M’Keever v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 396, [was] affirmed on appeal 
by this court . . . .”). 
139 McKeever, 14 Ct. Cl. at 397. 
140 Id. at 403.  The court reporter stated that the facts of the case as found by the court 
included that “[t]he board on infantry equipments, which recommended [McKeever’s] invention . . . , 
acted in the belief, derived from their own impressions of the law, that the government would not be 
put to the additional expense of royalty for the use of an invention made by an officer of the Army.”  
Id.   
141 Id. at 418. 
142 Id. at 417; Feather v. The Queen, (1865) 122 Eng. Rep. 1191 (Q.B.). 
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London Small Arms Company.143  The court, acknowledging that such may be the 
law of England, then went into an extended review (for a case such as this) of the 
history of the British patent system up through the controversy leading to the 
Statute of Monopolies.144  It did so to show the background of the “obnoxious patents” 
that both triggered that Statute and lead to the antipathy in the United States 
towards patents as discretionary prerogatives or privileges of the sovereign which 
can be granted as matters of grace or favor and not of right: 
In this country, on the contrary, our organic law recognizes in the clearest 
terms that mind-work which we term inventions. . . . Instead of placing our 
patent system upon the English foundation of executive favor and 
conferring that prerogative of the Crown upon the President, they 
transferred all authority to the legislative department of the government 
(the department which regulates rights), by placing it among the specially 
enumerated powers of Congress. 
. . . . 
. . . Congress are not empowered to grant to inventors a favor, but to secure 
to them a right.  And the term “to secure a right” by no possible implication 
carries with it the opposite power of destroying the right in whole or in part 
by appropriating it to the purposes of government without complying with 
that other condition of the Constitution, the making of “just compensation.”  
Neither does the term “the exclusive right” admit of an implication that with 
regard to such patentable articles as the government may need the right 
shall not be exclusive.  The transfer of the power from the executive to the 
legislature; the abandonment of the terms “grant” and “patent”; the 
substitution of the words “secure,” “right,” and “exclusive”; the absence of an 
express reservation which at common law attaches to favors of the Crown or 
is inferable from the terms “grant” and “patent,” are facts which combine to 
demonstrate that the framers of the Constitution designed to place the work 
of the inventor among legal rights, which, when properly “secured” in a 
manner to be provided by law, should become property in the eye of the law 
and be respected as such by the government as by the citizen. 
Pursuant to the plain intent of the Constitution, Congress have never 
sought to attach such a condition to the issuing of a patent; private acts 
have been passed remitting claims for the use of patented inventions to this 
court for adjudication; statutes have been enacted prohibiting or regulating 
the use of patented articles in the government service (12 Stat. L., 91, 104, 
§ 3; Rev. Stat., § 1537); appropriations have been made to pay inventors the 
royalty justly due for their property thus taken for public use; the executive 
departments have freely resorted to patented articles for the purposes of the 
government, and have made them the subject of express contracts.  The 
                                                                                                                                                
143 McKeever, 14 Ct. Cl. at 417; Dixon v. The London Small Arms Co., (1876) Q.B.D. 384 (Eng.). 
144 McKeever, 14 Ct. Cl. at 417–20. 
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course of the legislature and the practice of the executive alike forbid the 
assumption that this government has ever sought to appropriate the 
property of the inventor, or that it has ever asserted an inherent right to do 
so analogous to that reserved in Great Britain by the Crown.145 
The government also argued that the use by government agents of McKeever’s 
patented invention was either a tort or under a gratuitous license from McKeever.146  
The court rejected these as “extreme views”: 
When a vendible article, such as ordinarily is the subject of bargain and 
sale, is offered by a producer to a consumer, though with no price specified, 
and is accepted and used by the latter, it is not to be supposed, on the one 
hand, that the offer was intended as a gift inter vivos, nor implied, on the 
other, that the taking was with a tortious intent.147 
It then recounted the events leading up to the government’s adoption and use of 
McKeever’s cartridge boxes, including the facts that the military board had solicited 
submissions of such items, that McKeever had complied with that process, that the 
board had selected his design (albeit as somewhat modified by the government), and 
that the government repeatedly referred to it as “your patent cartridge-boxes” and 
similar descriptions.148  Anticipating later concerns of military defense contractors, 
the court also addressed the issue of patented inventions that had essentially only 
one purchaser, the government:  “The claimant had gone to the expense of turning 
his invention into property; it was an article salable almost exclusively to the 
government; his offer imported a desire to sell to almost the only purchaser of such 
articles . . . .”149 
Finally, the government argued that the Court of Claims had no jurisdiction 
over patent cases because the Patent Act considered infringement a tort and placed 
jurisdiction in the regular district courts, and not the Court of Claims.150  The court 
rejected this because it considered the facts to show an implied license or contract 
with the government, which was exclusively the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.151  
The court further bolstered its position by contrasting the instant facts with those of 
other cases where the aggrieved party had potential remedies in other venues.152  
                                                                                                                                                
145 Id. at 421. 
146 Id. at 422.  
147 Id.  
148 Id. at 422–23.  The court gave an analogy to further underscore what it felt to be the 
extreme nature of the defendant’s position: 
If the Quarter-master-General had appointed a board to select a wood-lot for the 
fuel of the army, and a farmer had written to him recommending his wood, and the board 
had reported in favor of it, and the Quartermaster Department had proceeded to cut and 
use the wood, can it be supposed that this would be deemed a tortious taking on the part 
of the Quartermaster-General or a gratuitous license on the part of the farmer? 
Id. at 423. 
149 Id. 
150 Id.  
151 Id. at 423–24. 
152 Id. at 424. 
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Establishing what would become the central vexing issue for the question of patent 
owner remedies against unauthorized government use, the court stated: 
In the present case the claimant has confessedly no remedy in the circuit 
court against the government, and is without a remedy to recover for his 
property taken for public use, unless the act creating this court gives him 
one.  That act was passed long after the establishment of the patent system; 
it is comprehensive in terms; it makes no exception either as regards the 
kind of property which may be the subject of an implied contract or as 
regards the jurisdiction of other courts over suits between ordinary 
litigants.  Where, as in this case, there is clearly an implied contract 
between the government and the citizen; and the suit is brought entirely 
upon that agreement, and the claimant is without judicial redress 
elsewhere, we perceive no reason why we should engraft an exception upon 
the statute which Congress have not placed there.153 
Notwithstanding this forceful statement by Judge Nott in this case, the issue would 
not be resolved so easily.  Difficult fact patterns would arise in which it was less clear 
whether the government had intended to engage in any kind of contract, express or 
implied, with the patent owner.  In such cases, the subject matter would fall outside 
the Court of Claims’ jurisdiction, and could most plausibly be argued as only the tort 
of patent infringement, which in turn could not be alleged against the government.154  
This would leave only the claim of a government taking.  At the same time, the 
question of whether the government should have ownership of, or at least a license 
to, government employees’ inventions was likewise unresolved. 
 These matters returned to the Supreme Court in the 1881 Supreme Court case 
of James v. Campbell,155 which involved the somewhat banal, although evidently 
quite useful, patent for a double stamping mechanism that could be used to 
simultaneously postmark and cancel the postage stamp on a letter.156  The assignee 
of the patent brought suit in the Circuit Court of the Southern District of New York 
directly against the United States Postmaster for the City of New York, Thomas 
James, for infringing the patent by using a device alleged to embody it in the New 
York post office.157  An earlier claim brought before the Court of Claims was 
“overruled” by that court,158 possibly in mistaken reliance on Pitchers’ Case.  And, 
similar to the arguments in that case, the circuit court viewed the facts in James as 
simple patent infringement by a lower level government official which could not be 
imputed to the federal government as a taking.159  The court found for the plaintiffs, 
                                                                                                                                                
153 Id. 
154 See James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358–59 (1881). 
155 104 U.S. 356 (1881). 
156 Id. at 359. 
157 Id. at 357. 
158 Id. 
159 Compare James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 359 (1881) (“We doubt very much whether such 
an action can be sustained. It is substantially a suit against the United States itself, which cannot 
be maintained under the guise of a suit against its officers and agents except in the manner 
provided by law.”), with Adams v. Bradley, 1 F. Cas. 93, 97 (C.C.D. Nev. 1878) (No. 48) (“Without an 
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who had brought an action in equity, likely because of the new injunctive relief 
provisions of the Patent Act of 1870.160 
However, the Supreme Court overturned this result.  It first reiterated its 
position from earlier cases that the United States has no more rights to practice 
patents duly issued to others than regular citizens do, absent authorization from 
and/or compensation to the patent owner.161  But, it built upon Judge Nott’s concerns 
in McKeever over the special issues of patents with little to no use outside the 
government:  “Many inventions relate to subjects which can only be properly used by 
the government, such as explosive shells, rams, and submarine batteries to be 
attached to armed vessels.  If it could use such inventions without compensation, the 
inventors could get no return at all for their discoveries and experiments.”162  
Further, it offered some insights into how the government was trying to manage a 
new world in which inventions were becoming increasingly important to the 
execution of governmental functions: 
It has been the general practice, when inventions have been made which 
are desirable for government use, either for the government to purchase 
them from the inventors, and use them as secrets of the proper department; 
or, if a patent is granted, to pay the patentee a fair compensation for their 
use.163  
The Court also strengthened its comments from Burn’s Case that there would be no 
equivalent in U.S. patent law to British Crown Rights.164  Related to this, the Court 
stated that patent applicants, upon satisfying the statutory criteria, are “entitled to 
                                                                                                                                                
act of congress no direct proceedings will lie at the suit of an individual against the United States or 
its property; and no officer of the government can waive its privilege in this respect, nor lawfully 
consent that such a suit may be prosecuted so as to bind the government.”). 
160 Campbell v. James, 4 F. Cas. 1168, 1173 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1879) (No. 2361) rev’d, 104 U.S. 356 
(1881); see Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, §§ 52, 55, 58, 60, 16 Stat. 198, 198–217. 
161 Id. at 357–58. 
 
That the government of the United States when it grants letters-patent for a new 
invention or discovery in the arts, confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in the 
patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself, 
without just compensation, any more than it can appropriate or use without compensation 
land which has been patented to a private purchaser, we have no doubt.   The 
Constitution gives to Congress power ‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts 
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their 
respective writings and discoveries,’ which could not be effected if the government had a 
reserved right to publish such writings or to use such inventions without the consent of 
the owner.   
Id. 
162 Id. at 358. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. (“The United States has no such prerogative as that which is claimed by the sovereigns 
of England, by which it can reserve to itself, either expressly or by implication, a superior dominion 
and use in that which it grants by letters-patent to those who entitle themselves to such grants.”). 
[12:145 2012] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 168 
 
[the patent grant] as a matter of right, and does not receive it, as was originally 
supposed to be the case in England, as a matter of grace and favor.”165 
But, the James Court also took pains to suggest, in dicta, that the Court of 
Claims’ recommendation that infringement actions be brought directly against 
government officials in the circuit courts was just plain wrong:  
The course adopted in the present case, of instituting an action against a 
public officer, who acts only for and in behalf of the government, is open to 
serious objections.  We doubt very much whether such an action can be 
sustained.  It is substantially a suit against the United States itself, which 
cannot be maintained under the guise of a suit against its officers and 
agents except in the manner provided by law.166 
The Court did, however, acknowledge the existing statutory and jurisdictional 
challenges to plaintiffs seeking compensation, or even injunctive relief, for 
unauthorized use of their patents by the government.167  At the same time, given the 
change of position in the Court of Claims, as evidenced by decisions such as 
McKeever, the James Court noted that patent owners could approach the Court of 
Claims with actions in assumpsit based on theories of implied contract with the 
government.168  Ultimately, however, the James Court conceded that the Court of 
Claims’ jurisdiction in such matters has not been tested by the Supreme Court, and 
that if the Court of Claims’ jurisdiction does not reach to these cases, then “the only 
remedy against the United States, until Congress enlarges the jurisdiction of that 
                                                                                                                                                
165 Id.  This last point is also supported by the affirmative language in both the 1836 and 1870 
patent acts that patents must be issued where the invention and application meet all requisite 
criteria.  See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117, 119–20; Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230 § 24, 
16 Stat. 198, 201. 
166 James, 104 U.S. at 359. Similar arguments would later be considered in Ex Parte Young 
with regard to actions to obtain injunctions against state officials in their individual capacity in 
ways that were clearly attempts to limit state action.  Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).  In that 
case, Railway stockholders filed suit against the Minnesota State Attorney General complaining 
that a state statute establishing railway rates was unconstitutional.  Id. at 129.  The district court 
enjoined the enforcement of the statute, and when the Attorney General violated the injunction by 
attempting to enforce the statute anyway, the court found him in contempt and issued an injunction 
against him in his individual capacity.  Id. at 132.  The Attorney General appealed on the basis of 
state sovereign immunity.  Id. at 141.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that state officials did 
not enjoy the protection of sovereign immunity when they attempt to enforce unconstitutional laws.  
Id. at 167. 
167 James, 104 U.S. at 358–59. 
[T]he mode of obtaining compensation from the United States for the use of an 
invention, where such use has not been by the consent of the patentee, has never 
been specifically provided for by any statute.  The most proper forum for such a 
claim is the Court of Claims, if that court has the requisite jurisdiction.  As its 
jurisdiction does not extend to torts, there might be some difficulty, as the law 
now stands, in prosecuting in that court a claim for the unauthorized use of a 
patented invention . . . . 
Id. 
168 Id. at 359 (“[W]here the tort is waived, and the claim is placed upon the footing of an 
implied contract, we understand that the court has in several recent instances entertained the 
jurisdiction.”). 
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court, would be to apply to Congress itself.”169  Because the James Court was able to 
decide the case on the basis of patent invalidity anyway, it expressly disavowed any 
resolution of these other issues at that time.170  Notwithstanding these other issues, 
the central finding that neither the government nor its employees could practice 
private patents without authorization and/or compensation was now settled enough 
to be treated as the law of the land by at least one major patent treatise of the 
period.171  
By the end of the decade, Congress had indeed enlarged the Court of Claims’ 
jurisdiction.  Under a revised and restated enabling statute passed in 1887, the Court 
of Claims now had the authority to “hear and determine the following matters”: 
 First.  All claims founded upon the Constitution of the United States or 
any law of Congress, except for pensions, or upon any regulation of an 
Executive Department, or upon any contract, expressed or implied, with the 
Government of the United States, or for damages, liquidated or 
unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort, in respect of which claims the 
party would be entitled to redress against the United States either in a 
court of law, equity, or admiralty if the United States were suable . . . . 
 Second.  All set-offs, counter-claims, claims for damages, whether 
liquidated or unliquidated, or other demands whatsoever on the part of the 
Government of the United States against any claimant against the 
Government in said court . . . .172 
Returning yet again to the issue of government rights with respect to employee 
inventions, in Solomons v. United States173 and United States v. Davis,174 the Court of 
Claims decided that even when a government employee is specifically charged with 
inventing as a general matter, he may patent resulting inventions himself, but the 
government does get a non-exclusive license.175  Inexplicably, this made the hired-to-
invent claim harder for the government to prove than it was for private employers 
under cases such as Hapgood v. Hewitt.176  To be clear, courts were refusing to 
equitably convey title to private employers even where an employee was specifically 
hired to invent unless the employee had also expressly agreed to assign the 
inventions.177  However, the rationale in Solomons and Davis was not one of shop 
rights, but rather that the employee could not be unjustly enriched by work done for 
                                                                                                                                                
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 See ALBERT H. WALKER, TEXTBOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 145 (Baker, Voorhis & Co., 4th ed. 1904). 
172 Tucker Act of 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012)).  
173 Solomons v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 335 (1887). 
174 United States v. Davis, 23 Ct. Cl. 329 (1888).  
175 Solomons, 22 Ct. Cl. at 342; Davis, 23 Ct. Cl. at 334. 
176 Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226 (1886). 
177 E.g., id. at 233 (affirming the district court’s decision that the employee-inventor’s contract, 
as written, did not require him to assign his patent to the employer, and thus, title to the employee-
inventor’s patent had not been equitably assigned to the employer). 
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the government by being effectively paid twice for the invention he was hired to 
make.178  At the same time, the Solomons and Davis decisions allowed the employees 
to enforce their patents against private third parties, which would mean that they 
were still profiting in some ways from their government work beyond their regular 
compensation.179  
In 1888, the Supreme Court affirmed a Court of Claims finding of implied 
contract as a basis for recovery against the government in United States v. Palmer,180 
on a fact pattern quite similar to McKeever.  In fact, the government use at issue—in 
this case, patented infantry equipment, including braces—stemmed from the same 
military board procurement process as that in McKeever.181  Likewise, the same 
record of express adoption of the patented inventions by the government was found 
by the Court of Claims.182  Also similarly, the government later argued that its 
alleged actions were simply patent infringement—a tort—that fell outside the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.183  Affirming the Court of Claims, the Palmer 
Court held that jurisdiction in the Court of Claims was proper where there was an 
express or implied contract with the government: 
[W]hile that objection [that an action on a patent cannot be brought in the 
Court of Claims] may be available as to actions for infringement of a patent, 
in which its validity may be put in issue, and in which the peculiar defenses 
authorized by the patent laws . . . may be set up, it is not valid as against 
actions founded on contracts for the use of patented inventions.184  
In Palmer, the Court had already confirmed that:  “This is not a claim for 
infringement, but a claim of compensation for an unauthorized use,-two things 
totally distinct in the law; as distinct as trespass on lands is from use and occupation 
under a lease.”185 
The Supreme Court then affirmed Solomons in 1890, but did not find a hired-to-
invent right in the government, and wrote in dicta what became the seminal 
formulation of the hired-to-invent rule: 
An employe[e], performing all the duties assigned to him in his department 
of service, may exercise his inventive faculties in any direction he chooses, 
with the assurance that whatever invention he may thus conceive and 
perfect is his individual property.  There is no difference between the 
government and any other employer in this respect.  But this general rule is 
                                                                                                                                                
178 Davis, 23 Ct. Cl. at 334.  
179 E.g., id. (discussing only the limitations on remedies against the government, not private 
third parties, against whom the patent would be enforceable).  
180 United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262 (1888). 
181 Compare id. at 262–63, with McKeever v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. at 442 (recounting a 
military board made up of the same officers to meet July 1, 1874 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas). 
182 Palmer, 128 U.S. at 268–69. 
183 Id. at 269. 
184 Id. (citing United States v. Burns, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 246 (1870) and other cases, and 
distinguishing Pitcher v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 7 (1863)). 
185 Id. 
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subject to these limitations:  If one is employed to devise or perfect an 
instrument, or a means for accomplishing a prescribed result, he cannot, 
after successfully accomplishing the work for which he was employed, plead 
title thereto as against his employer.  That which he has been employed and 
paid to accomplish becomes, when accomplished, the property of his 
employer.  Whatever rights as an individual he may have had in and to his 
inventive powers, and that which they are able to accomplish, he has sold in 
advance to his employer.186 
Meanwhile, the shop rights and hired-to-invent doctrines for private companies 
continued to evolve as the Supreme Court decided two new cases in 1893.  First, in 
Dalzell v. Dueber Watch-Case Manufacturing Co., the Court held that the express 
agreement necessary for invocation of the hired-to-invent exception and equitable 
conveyance of patent rights need not be in writing.187  And second, in Lane & Bodley 
Co. v. Locke, the Court held that, where the employee conducted experiments at his 
employer’s expense, and then remained employed for a long time with full knowledge 
that the resultant invention was being used by the employer, the employee had 
granted an implied license to the employer.188 
That same year, the Supreme Court decided another government employee case 
in McAleer v. United States.189  The employee argued that he executed a formal 
assignment of the patent to the government in exchange for consideration that 
included his continued employment.190  However, there was nothing in the written 
agreement to that effect.191  While the Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, and 
endorsed the lower court’s references to Solomon and Davis, the true basis of the 
holding was that the written assignment agreement was “a complete legal obligation 
in itself, with no uncertainty as to the object or extent of the engagement, and could 
not be defeated, contradicted, or varied by proof of any collateral parol agreement 
inconsistent with its terms.”192 
Around this same time, the Court of Claims found that a government employee 
who invented a device before being employed by the government was not receiving 
unjust enrichment when he required compensation for government use of his 
patented invention in Talbert v. United States.193  The Supreme Court affirmed the 
case in 1894, but only on the limited appeal of the amount of compensation, which 
the Court found to be an issue of fact, not law.194  An important theme developing in 
the government employee cases was the prevention of government employees abusing 
their offices by requiring the government to use their patents and then profiting from 
the royalties. 
                                                                                                                                                
186 Solomons v. United States, 11 S. Ct. 88 (1890). 
187 Dalzell v. Dueber Watch-Case Mfg. Co., 149 U.S. 315, 320 (1893). 
188 Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193, 201 (1893). 
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193 Talbert v. United States, 25 Ct. Cl. 141, 153–55 (1890). 
194 Talbert v. United States, 155 U.S. 45, 46 (1894). 
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That same year, the Supreme Court decided the seminal case of Schillinger v. 
United States,195 which involved a patent for an improvement in laying concrete 
pavement issued to John J. Schillinger.196  The actual infringer was a government 
contractor working for the architect of the U.S. Capitol to lay concrete pavement on 
the Capitol grounds.197  Further, this contractor had indemnified the United States 
for any patent infringement actions against the latter arising from the execution of 
this work, even as there was substantial debate as to whether the architect knew 
that the contractor might employ a pavement arguably infringing the Schillinger 
patent.198  Yet, unlike the patent owner in James v. Campbell, who chose to bring a 
personal action against an officer of the United States in circuit court,199 and perhaps 
following the Supreme Court’s admonishment in that case,200 the owners of the 
Schillinger patent brought an action in assumpsit based on an implied contract 
theory directly against the United States in the Court of Claims.201  However, the 
wrinkle was that the actions were those of the contractor and not of government 
employees.202  The Court of Claims held that there was no contract express or implied 
between the government and the claimants and that accordingly the matter was 
outside of its jurisdiction (as explained further below).203 
The claimants appealed to the Supreme Court which affirmed the Court of 
Claims decision.204  The tenor of the majority’s opinion towards unauthorized 
government use of private patents, as expressed by Justice Brewer in his opinion for 
the majority, is quite different from that in the James case.205  Whereas, in James, 
the question of the nature of the patent grant was discussed by the majority and 
dissent alternately as property or contract, in Schillinger, the focus of potential 
government liability for unauthorized use of a private patent was first and foremost 
on the sovereign immunity of the United States: 
The United States cannot be used in their courts without their consent, and 
in granting such consent congress has an absolute discretion to specify the 
cases and contingencies in which the liability of the government is 
submitted to the courts for judicial determination.  Beyond the letter of such 
consent the courts may not go, no matter how beneficial they may deem, or 
in fact might be, their possession of a larger jurisdiction over the liabilities 
of the government.206 
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The Court then reviewed the relevant history of the U.S. Court of Claims and 
concluded that the latter had no jurisdiction to hear cases against the government 
arising in tort.207  Applying this to the case at hand, it argued that the patent 
infringement at issue “was a tort pure and simple.”208  But, the outcome of this 
analysis was that because the activities at issue were primarily those of the private 
contractor—amounting to a misappropriation sounding only in tort—and not a 
breach of an express or implied contract by the government, then the case fell outside 
of the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.209  At the same time, because the Court 
holds that the government’s power to choose whether and when it can be sued in its 
own courts is essentially absolute, the claimants have no remedy or recourse against 
the government in any other forum either.210 
The Court also addressed the argument that a government taking of private 
property creates a claim “founded upon the constitution of the United States” that 
brings it squarely within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims under the 1887 Act, 
regardless of whether the taking was also a misappropriation.211  This is a powerful 
argument that the Court rebuffs primarily through a reductio ad absurdum: 
If that argument be good, it is equally good applied to every other provision 
of the constitution as well as to every law of congress.  This prohibition of 
the taking of private property for public use without compensation is no 
more sacred than that other constitutional provision that no person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.  Can it be 
that congress intended that every wrongful arrest and detention of an 
individual, or seizure of his property by an officer of the government, should 
expose it to an action for damages in the court of claims?  If any such 
breadth of jurisdiction was contemplated, language which had already been 
given a restrictive meaning would have been carefully avoided.212 
At the same time the Court appeared willing to grant that an action against the 
government seeking compensation for use of a privately held patent might properly 
lie within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims based on a theory of express or 
implied contract.  The Court cited the facts of Palmer for the easy case where the 
patentee “‘invited the government to adopt his patented infantry equipments, and 
the government did so.”213  Under those facts, “‘an implied contract for compensation 
fairly arose under the license to use, and the actual use, little or much, that ensued 
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thereon.”214  This was similar to the decisions in Burns and McKeever.  The Court 
then cited other property use cases where an implied contract was held to have been 
entered into by the government.215  In each, the key elements for the Court seemed to 
have been that (i) there was at least some meeting of the minds between the property 
owner and the government evidencing the assent of the owner to such use, and (ii) 
the government gave clear acknowledgment that it was appropriating the use of the 
owner’s property and thus made “no pretense of title.”216 
But, in Schillinger, “the claimants never authorized the use of the patent right 
by the government; never consented to, but always protested against it; threatening 
to interfere by injunction or other proceedings to restrain such use.”217  Further: 
There was no point in the whole transaction from its commencement to its 
close where the minds of the parties met, or where there was anything in 
the semblance of an agreement.  So, not only does the petition count upon a 
tort, but also the findings show a tort.  That is the essential fact underlying 
the transaction, and upon which rests every pretense of a right to recover.218 
Thus, even while the Court conceded that “a party may sometimes waive a tort and 
sue in assumpsit, as on an implied promise,” it countered that “it is technically a 
sufficient reply to say that these claimants have not done so.  They have not counted 
on any promise, either express or implied.”219 
At the same time, the Court made it clear that its opinion was not merely an 
exercise in formalism, potentially denying relief to a righteous claimant due to a 
technicality.220  Rather, the Court appeared to be troubled by what it perceived to be 
a lack of clear authorization by the government, or even its agent, to infringe 
Schillinger’s patent: 
There was no act of congress in terms directing or even by implication 
suggesting, the use of the patent.  No officer of the government directed its 
use, and the contract which was executed by [the contractor] did not name 
or describe it.  There was no recognition by the government or any of its 
officers of the fact that in the construction of the pavement there was any 
use of the patent, or that any appropriation was being made of claimants’ 
property.  The government proceeded as though it were acting only in the 
management of its own property and the exercise of its own rights, and 
without any trespass upon the rights of the claimants.221 
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These facts would mitigate against a finding of an implied contract under the Court’s 
criteria set out above. 
The Court also seemed to suggest an element of bad faith on the part of the 
claimants for the latter’s use of the tort waiver/implied contract argument upon 
appeal:  “There was no suggestion of a waiver of the tort, or a pretense of any implied 
contract, until after the decision of the court of claims that it had no jurisdiction over 
an action to recover for the tort.”222  Finally, the Court took a further swipe at the 
legitimacy of claimants’ allegations of infringement by the government in that the 
latter wound up with none of the claimants’ property at the end of the project: 
But what property of the claimants has the government appropriated?  It 
has and uses the pavement as completed in the capitol grounds, but there is 
no pretense of a patent on the pavement as a completed structure.  When a 
contractor, in the execution of his contract, uses any patented tool, machine, 
or process, and the government accepts the work done under such contract, 
can it be said to have appropriated and be in possession of any property of 
the patentee in such a sense that the patentee may waive the tort, and sue 
as on an implied promise?223 
However, this eminent domain power seemed to reach only the practice of the 
patent by or on behalf of the government (i.e., as part of a government function or 
service) and required compensation for the taking.224  It did not authorize the 
conventional compulsory license, where the sovereign grants, or requires the grant of, 
a license from the patent holder to one or more of the latter’s competitors to be used 
in competition with the patent holder.  This conventional compulsory license is a 
“rarity” in the U.S. patent system.225 
The difference between the eminent domain license and the conventional 
compulsory license is not merely semantic.  Rather, it is decidedly practical because 
it determines who pays the patent owner for the unauthorized use of her patent.  In 
the eminent domain license, the government must compensate her either when it 
practices the patent directly or when it authorizes a private contractor to practice the 
patent on its behalf.226  But, the sole arbiter of this compensation is the Court of 
Federal Claims, and the patent owner must bring suit there to receive any 
compensation—no payments flow “automatically” from the exercise of the eminent 
domain license.227  Contrast this with the conventional compulsory license in which 
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either the government sets the compensation rate ex ante as part of the license grant, 
or a court or administrative body establishes what a “reasonable” royalty rate is ex 
post.228  In either of these cases, the licensed party—who is permitted to bring the 
patented product to market on its own behalf as a private commercial venture—pays 
the patent owner for this unauthorized use of the patent owner’s patent.229 
Consequently, the conventional compulsory license is a better financial 
proposition for the government.  But, absent specific language in the compulsory 
license order to the contrary, the government is left with relatively little control over 
how the patent will be practiced and has no right to practice the patent itself.  
Further, the conventional compulsory license is likely viewed with far more distaste 
by patent owners than the eminent domain license because a compulsory license 
authorizes a patent owner’s competitors to compete with her in the commercial 
marketplace based on her own technology.230  The eminent domain license instead 
gives the government control over the practice of the patent even while it keeps the 
patent owner’s commercial competitors at bay.231 
Therefore, a fundamental issue in considering either type of involuntary grant is 
the policy objective the government is trying to achieve.  For example, if the objective 
is simply to level a commercial playing field where a patent owner has acted in an 
anticompetitive manner based in part on her patents, then a compulsory license to 
competitors might be warranted.  In fact, such compulsory licenses (as well as 
outright assignments) have been key components of settlements of some antitrust 
actions brought by the federal government.232  But, if instead the objective is to make 
sure that the government has access to technology that it needs to fulfill its core 
purposes, then clearly an eminent domain license is indicated.  Indeed, it was the 
concern that the federal government would not be able to procure enough munitions 
in wartime that led to the statutory codification of the government’s eminent domain 
powers regarding patents.233  Private contractors had become reluctant to take on 
government munitions contracts because they feared patent infringement lawsuits by 
the private patent owners whose inventions had been incorporated without 
authorization or license into those munitions.234  
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The value of the government’s eminent domain powers with respect to patents is 
practically limited then in two ways.  First, it must still compensate the patent owner 
for the use, which adds to the cost of procuring the good or service that it needs.235  
Second, private contractors may still be subject to the costs of responding in court to 
infringement lawsuits, before moving to have them dismissed.236  Accordingly, where 
the government can develop its own technologies, it can avoid the complications of 
takings actions. 
There are three further reasons why the government might be interested in 
developing its own technologies and holding the related patents.  First, assuming the 
validity of the theory that government’s main purpose is to provide necessary 
services that will not be forthcoming from the private sector in a market economy, 
there will be any number of technologies that the government will need that will 
simply not be developed in a timely fashion, or at all, without government 
intervention.237  Second, it may be in the general interest to have some sensitive 
technologies controlled by the federal government, rather than by private parties, at 
least until the technology falls into the public domain and is freely available to all.238  
Third, commencing with the government’s direct involvement in scientific and 
technological research and development (“R&D”) through both its own intramural 
research and its support of extramural research, it has found itself in the position of 
holding at least equitable rights to patents arising from such R&D, similar to 
employers and other private funders of R&D initiatives.239  This leads directly to the 
question of whether the government should be giving away what is arguably its 
property, and if so, under what conditions. 
A year after Schillinger, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Berdan 
Firearms Manufacturing Co. on appeal from the Court of Claims.240  Although 
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seemingly similar to McKeever and Palmer, this case was more difficult.  Berdan, the 
patent owner, sought compensation on two separate patents for guns.241  On the first 
patent, which was a combination patent, the government appears not to have used 
all elements of the combination, and thus the Court of Claims rejected, and the 
Supreme Court affirmed, that the government neither infringed the patent nor had 
any kind of express or implied contract for use of the patented invention.242  On the 
second patent, the Court of Claims found, and the Supreme Court affirmed, that the 
government did indeed use the patented invention in a manner that “were [the 
government] a private person, [it] would be liable to an action of infringement.”243  
The government tried to argue both that one of its own engineers had later 
“invented” the particular device and that the employee’s version was materially 
different from Berdan’s patent, as well as that the government had used it based only 
on the knowledge of its own employee’s invention.244  But, of course, independent 
discovery is no defense to patent infringement.245  Notwithstanding, the Court 
acknowledged that “something more than a mere infringement, which is a tort, and 
not within the jurisdiction of the court of claims, is necessary to enable the petitioner 
to maintain this action.”246  In particular, “[s]ome contractual liability must be 
shown.”247  The Court then found the evidence to fairly show that Berdan intended 
for the government to use the invention with his consent, in accordance with his 
wishes, and with the expectation of compensation.248  In this case, however, the Court 
emphasized the need for evidence of mutuality of assent to find an express or implied 
contract.249  While this is indeed black letter contract law—as good now as it was in 
the nineteenth century—the Palmer and McKeever courts do not seem to have 
focused on it as carefully.250  Nonetheless, after reviewing the evidence in detail, the 
Berdan Court found both no evidence negating assent on the part of the government 
and some evidence positively showing assent by at least some officers in the 
military.251  This was sufficient to “bring the case clearly within U.S. v. Palmer,” and 
for the Court to affirm the Court of Claims’ finding of a contract sufficient to award 
some recovery to Berdan.252  The failure of the parties to set a price for the license 
was found to be no more problematic here than it was in Palmer or United States. v. 
Russell.253 
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In 1896, the Supreme Court considered yet a different angle in this ongoing 
battle.  In Belknap v. Schild, the patent owner sought an injunction and damages 
against the government officials who operated a caisson gate at a government facility 
in California covered by his patents.254  The lower court had granted both the 
injunctions and a damages award of $40,000 against the officials.255  The Supreme 
Court agreed that government officials were not immune from suit simply because of 
their position, even when acting within their official capacities.256  However, 
injunctions against individual officials, which would have the effect of precluding the 
government from using its property, could not be allowed without the United States 
as a joined party.257  Further, where the profits arising from the unauthorized use by 
the officials accrued only to the government rather than the officials personally, then 
damages for those profits could not be awarded against the officials.258  Justice 
Harlan dissented  on the grounds that the majority’s ruling would leave patent 
owners with no effective remedies against the government for unauthorized use of 
patents where no argument for implied license could bring the case within the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.259 
That same year, the Supreme Court also returned yet again to government 
employee inventions in Gill v. United States.260  The claimed distinction was that 
Gill, the employee, had been hired neither to invent nor to use his inventive 
capacities in any regard and had come up with the inventions on his own time, 
without the use of government resources.261  However, he then actually reduced the 
inventions to practice with government resources, and personally supervised the 
other government employees who built working versions of his arsenal machines.262  
Further, he never mentioned any proprietary position as against the government, nor 
did he attempt to charge or reserve the right to charge, the government for use of the 
machines until years later.263  No government official discussed any license or 
purchase terms with him for such government use.264  Gill later sold the rights to use 
his inventions to private parties, while reserving a right of use to the government, 
but the government remained the primary user of the inventions as they were 
specially adapted to military uses.265  The Court of Claims had dismissed the claims, 
and the Supreme Court affirmed.266  Aligning with later government patent policy 
under the Bayh-Dole Act,267 the Supreme Court considered the notion that the use of 
government resources to actually reduce the invention to practice could be enough to 
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grant at least a shop right license to the government, even though the invention had 
been conceived and constructively reduced to practice outside the scope of 
employment.268  But, ultimately, it based its affirmance on the grounds that Gill had 
granted an implied license to the government by his actions.269  
Even as the courts were working out the nature and contours of government use 
of employee and private citizen patents, the beginnings of formal government 
research funding began with intramural research conducted by the Department of 
Agriculture and Department of War early in the nineteenth century.270  The 
beginnings of extramural research arose later under the Morrill Act,271 Second 
Morrill Act,272 and Hatch Act of 1887,273 which provided support for state Land Grant 
Universities, Agricultural Colleges, and Agricultural Experiment Stations, 
respectively.  Once inventions started flowing from this research, the government 
needed to formulate policies for ownership and use of such government-funded 
inventions.  In the absence of federal policy guidance, universities held patents as 
independent legal entities, while professors occasionally patented inventions 
resulting from their research and simply took title as individuals.274  
II. MOVING TOWARDS RESOLUTION:  EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY STATUTORY AND CASE 
LAW DEVELOPMENTS 
As the twentieth century opened, all three strands of government patent policy 
were effectively governed by case law.  Government use of private patents was 
limited to suit for compensation in the Court of Claims, provided that the patent 
owner could show at least an implied license.  An open question remained as to the 
ability of patent owners to sue government officials in narrow ways for either 
injunctions or damages.  Government rights to employee inventions were limited, 
with the normal result being a shop right license—even where the employee was 
hired to invent.  And finally, government rights to inventions arising under 
extramural research appeared not to have been tested at all. 
In 1900’s Eager v. United States, the Court of Claims decided yet another case 
where a government employee sought compensation for the government’s use of his 
patented invention.275  In this case, a mechanic who was not hired to invent, but who, 
through his primary machinist duties, might design improvements to ordnance, had 
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improved upon suggested plans of his supervisor on his own time, and at his own 
house, for a machine to rifle cannon barrels.276  Streett, the inventor, made a claim to 
the Secretary of the Navy for compensation for his inventions, which was declined.277  
Neither he, nor his assignee, Eager, attempted to enter into a contract with the Navy 
licensing these inventions until after commencement of the Court of Claims 
proceeding.278  The court cited Solomons279 and Gill,280 while making much of the 
facts that Streett was “surrounded” by other talented individuals and that he was 
supervised by “knowledgeable” scientific and technical men,281 to find that neither 
Streett nor his assignee was entitled to compensation.282  The court seemed to doubt 
the validity of the patent, or perhaps even the sole inventor status of Streett, but 
neither issue was before it in the case.283 
The next year, the Supreme Court affirmed a Court of Claims dismissal of a 
patent owner’s claim for recovery in Russell v. United States.284  The plaintiff, a 
Captain of Ordnance in the Army, had a lengthy exchange with the Chief of 
Ordnance about whether the Army would adopt the plaintiff’s patented rifle 
magazine at a time when the Army was considering adopting a completely new rifle 
model.285  While this exchange initially seemed quite similar to those recounted in 
cases favorable to findings for compensation based on an implied contract, such as 
Palmer,286 McKeever,287 and Berdan,288 it then seemed to veer into more careful 
statements on the part of the government while also sending Russell on an odd and 
futile inquiry to the Patent Office to speak with the Commissioner of Patents 
regarding the Patent Office’s jurisdiction.289  Overall, it seemed like the Chief of 
Ordnance, on behalf of the Army, was giving Russell the run around and taking 
advantage of the latter’s clear lack of understanding of the exact process of seeking 
either a license or compensation.290  In other words, representatives of the Chief 
seemed to lead Russell to think that an arrangement might be worked out, even as 
they also suggested that the Norwegian company, who had won the overall bid to 
deliver the new army rifles, would compensate Russell either directly or through 
some sort of indemnification agreement with the government.291  It is true that, as 
the exchange went on, representatives of the Chief used increasingly careful 
language to basically push off Russell and let him know that he had to take up 
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matters directly with the Norwegian firm or through the Court of Claims.292  In the 
end, Russell was forced to bring an action in the Court of Claims.  He sought to 
position just as Palmer, McKeever, and Berdan had, but the Court of Claims 
sustained the government’s demurrer that no government official had in fact implied 
a contract to Russell.293  Writing for the Supreme Court on the appeal, Justice 
McKenna made much of the fact that the Army had adopted the Norwegian firm’s 
overall rifle design and not Russell’s.294  But, Russell had never argued that his 
patents covered the overall design of the gun.  Rather, he simply claimed that his 
patented magazine design was included in the Norwegian firm’s overall design.295  As 
if not understanding that a patent on an overall unit such as a rifle, or on some 
constituent parts, need not be in conflict with a patent on a specific separate 
component of that overall unit, both the Chief of Ordnance and the courts kept 
referring to the Patent Office’s grant of a patent to the Norwegian firm for either a 
patent on the entire gun (perhaps as a combination of other elements) or some parts 
of it, as if that were conclusive evidence that Russell’s patent could not have been 
infringed by the manufacture and use of the Norwegian design.296  Notwithstanding 
the misleading way that the Chief’s representatives seemed to deal with Russell, the 
Court may have been correct that by the end of the exchange of letters it was hard to 
make out an argument that the Army had assented to even an implied license.297  
Thus, both the Court of Claims and the Supreme Court concluded that there was no 
license.  
But, this of course then meant that Russell was out of luck, as he could not sue 
the government for the tort of patent infringement.  Thus, the question is whether 
the government had wised up after its failed attempts to escape compensation to 
patent owners (who in some cases were also military employees), such as Palmer, 
McKeever, and Berdan, by seeking to make sure that its officers in charge of 
procurement never made any clear statements to patent owners that might look like 
assent to a license.  If so, then this set the government on an abusive infringement 
policy that would give it de facto Crown Rights, as it could use patented inventions 
adversely with no hint of compensation and then hide behind the shield of sovereign 
immunity.  While this might have indirectly affected the goals of the government 
attorneys, in earlier cases, who cited British cases to argue that the U.S. government 
did possess something like a Crown Right, it surely went directly against the 
manifold Supreme Court opinions stating clearly that the United States did not have 
such rights. 
A few years later, in 1905, Justice McKenna once again wrote an opinion that 
essentially rejected rights for a government employee to receive compensation from 
the government for use of a patented invention.298  In Harley v. United States, an 
employee of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing had responded to the need for a 
register that could be placed on presses to control the printing of valuable securities 
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by submitting his design to the Chief of the Bureau.299  The Chief knew this was 
Harley’s own design and, upon concerns of Harley about seeking a patent to protect 
his interests, the Chief assured him, “[c]ertainly; I will see that you are protected.”300  
The Chief even went so far as to secure the services of a patent attorney for 
Harley.301  The device was shown to the Secretary of the Treasury, who quickly 
endorsed it.302  However, while Harley claimed to have expected compensation and 
that he believed that the Chief and the Secretary understood and agreed to this, the 
Chief and the Secretary claimed that they believed that, because Harley was a 
Treasury Department employee, he would neither expect nor demand 
remuneration.303  There was no argument that Harley was hired to invent the 
register or that he had done it on Treasury time or with Treasury resources.304  Six 
years went by with the Bureau using, on average, 200 of the registers per day over a 
period of 1082 working days.305  While the Court made much of the fact that Harley 
did not bring an express claim for remuneration either directly within the Bureau or 
Treasury or in the Court of Claims during this time, Harley argued that he was 
coerced by his subordinate position into not making more demands for compensation 
until finally bringing this suit.306  Justice McKenna brushed this off in what seemed 
a quite harsh position:  He seemed to think it was silly and unacceptable that Harley 
felt intimidated,307 but this may reveal more about McKenna and his great good 
fortune in being a Supreme Court Justice than about the true merits and equities of 
the situation.  In the end, similar to the outcome of Russell, the Court found the 
government’s efforts effective and persuasive in showing that, at least from its end, 
no assent had been forthcoming and thus there could have been no “meeting of the 
minds” to form a valid contract.308  It specifically cited Russell in support, and 
distinguished the instant facts from McKeever.309  It also cited Schillinger and 
Berdan for the proposition that contracts or obligations arising from tort (e.g., where 
the tort was waived by the patent owner and a suit was brought on the grounds of 
the quasi-contract assumpsit) would not satisfy the requirement for a true meeting of 
the minds and contract.310  This arguably raised the bar from earlier cases, which 
made out an implied contract exactly on the waived-tort assumpsit theory. 
In response to these developments, the question of redress for government use of 
private patents came to a head in Congress, and legislation was enacted. The first 
version of the Government Use Statute was passed as the Act of June 25, 1910, 
entitled “An Act to Provide Additional Protection for Owners of Patents of the United 
States, and for Other Purposes.”311  The title was telling because it positioned the Act 
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as something to benefit patent owners and not the government.  The original text is 
as follows: 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That whenever an invention 
described in and covered by a patent of the United States shall hereafter be 
used by the United States without license of the owner thereof or lawful 
right to use the same, such owner may recover reasonable compensation for 
such use by suit in the Court of Claims:  Provided, however, That said Court 
of Claims shall not entertain a suit or reward compensation under the 
provisions of this Act where the claim for compensation is based on the use 
by the United States of any article heretofore owned, leased, used by, or in 
the possession of, the United States:  Provided further, That in any such 
suit the United States may avail itself of any and all defenses, general or 
special, which might be pleaded by a defendant in an action for 
infringement, as set forth in [the Patent Act]:  And provided further, That 
the benefits of this Act, shall not inure to any patentee, who, when he 
makes such claim is in the employment or service of the Government of the 
United States; or the assignee of any such patentee; nor shall this Act apply 
to any device discovered or invented by such employee during the time of 
his employment or service.312 
Thus, while the Government Use Statute might seem like a compulsory license 
provision at first blush to the modern reader, it was in fact carefully crafted to 
address the absence of remedies for patent owners whose patents were practiced 
adversely by the government, while not disturbing the growing sense in the courts 
that the government should have rights to practice inventions of employees.  The 
first part of the statute addressed only those situations where no license could be 
made out for the government use, express or implied.  Further, it did not positively 
authorize such use by the government, as a compulsory license or Crown Right 
would.  Instead, it merely established that, to the extent such use might occur, the 
patent owner would no longer be left without a remedy:  Such patent owners could 
bring claims for compensation in the Court of Claims.  In other words, this was really 
an act to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.  At the same time, this 
would have no effect on patent owner claims based on true express or implied 
contracts with the government.  The first proviso addressed the fact patterns in 
Pitcher’s Case313 and Belknap314 by making clear that no such suit in the Court of 
Claims could provide compensation for the use by the government of physical 
property it possessed.  The second proviso empowered the government to use any 
defenses that a private defendant could use under the Patent Act of 1870.315  
Interestingly, the Act does not necessarily say that the action in the Court of Claims 
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is an infringement action under the Patent Act—that would be tantamount to saying 
that the government could engage in tortious activities, which the Supreme Court 
had expressly rejected on many occasions.316  Thus, the action may be like one for 
infringement, with similar claims and defenses, but it may not technically be an 
action for infringement sounding in tort.  The last proviso then established that 
government employees could not use the Act either while they were employees or for 
inventions created while in the government’s employ or service, if they were not 
employed by the government at the time of the intent to bring suit.317  Nor could they 
use assignees to essentially bring the action for them.318 
Before the Act was passed, however, the German corporation Krupp had brought 
suit in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for compensation from William 
Crozier, personally, for his actions as Chief of Ordnance of the U.S. Army for the 
manufacture of Krupp’s patented field guns and carriages in U.S. arsenals.319  The 
claims also sought an injunction preventing Crozier from directing such manufacture 
going forward.320  The latter claim likely was informed by the same legal arguments 
that impelled various aggrieved railroad owners to seek injunctions against state 
government officials in what became the landmark case of Ex Parte Young,321 as well 
as the earlier cases of James v. Campbell and Pitcher’s Case.  The original action in 
Young was filed in federal circuit court one week before Krupp filed its action in the 
D.C. court and sought an injunction preventing the state attorney general and others 
from enforcing a new set of tariffs under a law that railroad owners believed was 
unconstitutional for lack of due process.322  After the injunction issued, the attorney 
general sought to enforce the law anyway and was found in contempt of court and 
jailed.323  On a petition of habeas corpus based on state sovereign immunity under 
the Constitution, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s actions and dismissed 
the petition, holding that state officials could indeed be enjoined from enforcing 
illegal or unconstitutional laws.324  While this proceeding of Ex Parte Young in the 
Supreme Court was decided in March 1908, less than a year after the original filing 
in the circuit court,325  Krupp’s action against Crozier was not appealed to the 
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Supreme Court until 1911, after the Government Use Statute was enacted.326  In the 
D.C. court, the government had demurred on the grounds of insufficient jurisdiction 
on the theory that the case was really against the United States.327  Krupp had also 
given up, by stipulation, its claims for damages directly from Crozier.328  The court of 
appeals reversed and remanded on a holding later characterized by the Supreme 
Court as: 
[having] a broad distinction between interfering by injunction with the use 
by the United States of its property and the granting of a writ of injunction 
for the purpose of preventing the wrongful taking of private property, even 
although the individual who was enjoined from such taking was an officer of 
the government, and although the purpose of the proposed taking was to 
appropriate the private property when taken to a governmental purpose.329  
In the appeals court’s own words, as quoted by the Supreme Court: 
It will thus be seen that in the Belknap and Bruce Cases the subject-matter 
involved was property of the United States, and that therefore the United 
States was necessarily a party.  In the present case it is not sought to 
disturb the United States in the possession and use of the guns already 
manufactured.  The court is not asked to deal with property of the United 
States.  The plaintiff simply asks that an officer of the United States be 
restrained from invading rights granted by the government itself.  The acts 
complained of are not only not sanctioned by any law, but are inconsistent 
with the patent laws of the United States.330 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, in Crozier v. Krupp, the Supreme Court used the 
intervening enactment of the Government Use Statute to sidestep resolving two 
thorny and conflicting issues.331  On the one hand, the ability for patent owners to 
secure injunctions against government officials for essentially performing their tasks 
could effectively be injunctions against the government itself.  This was untenable, 
especially when important matters of the military were at stake.  
But, on the other hand, earlier cases such as James had declared the principle 
that ordinary government officials should not be able to commit the government to 
wrongful conversions of property, and so, could be enjoined as individuals from 
converting such property.332  The Court in Crozier quoted the 1910 version of the 
Government Use Statute and asserted that it was passed expressly to deal with these 
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kinds of situations (i.e., where there was neither an implied nor express license).333  
Thus, while acknowledging that the Government Use Statute primarily intended to 
benefit patent owners, the Court stated that the Statute also implicitly authorized 
the government to take or appropriate a license.334  The nature of the Statute then 
removed the possibility of the government engaging in tortious infringement of a 
patent because, at the moment of the “unauthorized” use, the government was 
considered to have constructively taken a license.335  This turned the action from a 
potential wrongful tort of conversion into a rightful appropriation under eminent 
domain theories.336  Accordingly, the Court reversed the appeals court, with an order 
to reinstate the trial court’s dismissal of the bill without prejudice, so that Krupp 
could bring a claim for compensation under the Government Use Statute directly 
against the United States in the Court of Claims.337 
The combination of the Crozier decision and the enactment of the Government 
Use Statute seemed finally to resolve, at least, the issue of which rights the 
government had as to unauthorized use of privately owned patents.  Nonetheless, 
Crozier was not entirely convincing that the Government Use Statute gave the 
government positive powers or simply an express statutory mechanism for taking 
licenses without permission of the owners.  Thus, the uneasy issue of whether the 
government was still relying on a general eminent domain power lingered, along with 
the question of whether it needed to engage in a formal process before exercising this 
power with regard to any particular patent. 
After Crozier, it was generally assumed that federal government contractors 
enjoyed the same protection under the Government Use Statute as government 
officials, based in part on the exception to injunctive relief for patent owners 
originating in Brady v. Atlantic Works.338  However, at the height of World War I, the 
Supreme Court rejected this interpretation in Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine 
Building Co. v. International Curtis Marine Turbine Co.339  In particular, the Court 
sought to cut back a bit on the Crozier Court’s broad statements regarding the 
government’s eminent domain rights under the Government Use Statutes as 
converting, automatically, any otherwise infringing action of a government official 
into a constructive license.340  More directly, the Cramp Court sought to distinguish 
the likely proper scenario, where the government specifically authorizes a contractor 
to manufacture an item that is covered by a third party’s patent, from the scenario 
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where the contractor simply chooses to infringe a third party’s patent in order to 
perform a contract for the government without the infringement being a necessary 
part of the contracted work.341  This former scenario was in line with the injunction 
exception established in Brady,342 whereas the latter was a bit more in line with the 
controversy in Schillinger.343  Whatever the merits of this distinction, the net result 
appeared to be a sudden reluctance on the part of key defense contractors to continue 
entering into government contracts for vital wartime machinery and munitions.  
Accordingly, partly as a result of a strident letter written by then Secretary of the 
Navy, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Congress voted to amend the Government Use 
Statute through the Naval Appropriations Act of 1918.344  The amendment extended 
the reach of the Statute to things manufactured on behalf of the government, thus 
bringing the action of contractors within its scope.345  Similar wartime concerns over 
patents led to the creation of the Army and Navy Patent Board.346 
In 1924, the Supreme Court turned back to the question of hired-to-invent 
scenarios in Standard Parts Co. v. Peck.347  The Court finally acted on the dicta in 
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Solomons and Gill that inventors, under a clear agreement to invent a particular 
thing as the primary or exclusive scope of their employ with compensation given for 
the resultant invention, could be equitably ordered to transfer title to the hiring 
party under the hired-to-invent rule.348  Peck entered into the following agreement: 
This agreement witnesseth that second party is to devote his time to the 
development of a process and machinery for the production of the front 
spring now used on the product of the Ford Motor Company.  First party is 
to pay second party for such services the sum of $300 per month.  That 
should said process and machinery be finished at or before the expiration of 
four months from August 11, 1915, second party is to receive a bonus of 
$100 a month.  That when finished second party is to receive a bonus of $10 
for each per cent. of reduction from present direct labor, as disclosed by the 
books of the first party.349 
The district court had ruled that Peck had to assign the resultant patent developed 
under this arrangement.350  However, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit reversed, granting the hiring party a shop right license only.351  In reversing 
the court of appeals, the Supreme Court made it clear that, while the 
pronouncements in Solomons and related cases about the hired-to-invent rule were 
dicta, they were dicta that the prior courts had relied on to reach their actual 
holdings.352  As such, the Standard Parts Court considered these statements 
controlling precedent and found Peck’s agreement to be a clear case of hired-to-invent 
where title should equitably be transferred to the hiring party.353 
Also in 1924, the District Court for the Southern District of New York decided 
Squier v. American Telephone & Telegraph Company, in which an army officer, who 
had invented on behalf of the army and then publicly dedicated his patent to the 
public,354 sought to reclaim exclusivity against the American Telephone & Telegraph 
Company (“AT&T”).355  Squier had invented in the field of wireless communication 
and sought to protect his inventions for the government.356  As such, he took 
advantage of the 1883 Act providing that the Patent Office waive fees for government 
employees who patented inventions with use rights granted to the government.357  
While he and the Signal Corps of the Army made much of the public dedication of the 
patent, it was done during a period when the 1883 Act was interpreted to mean that 
“any other person in the United States” meant literally any person, whether or not 
connected with the government, and not simply a catch-all to authorize use by 
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sundry individuals and organizations working with or on behalf of the government.358  
This point, in fact, was made by the Judge Advocate General of the Army (the “Army 
JAG”) in a 1910 opinion issued in response to Squier’s inquiry about seeking a patent 
on his invention.359  As part of Squier’s public proclamations about the dedication of 
his patent to the public he even said: 
I will say that I do not want one penny from any one for the discovery.  
There will be no royalties attached to the use of the plans and 
specifications, and the American Telephone & Telegraph Company, the War 
Department, you, or I are as welcome as can be to take copies of these 
specifications and build multiplex telephone.  I have arranged it so that 
these patents are in the name of the government and the people of the 
United States.360  
However, when a later Army JAG issued an opinion in 1918 stating that the 1883 Act 
proviso covered only persons working for or on behalf of the government,361 Squier 
suddenly changed his position and contacted AT&T to demand compensation of its 
ongoing use of his patented invention.362  Then, in 1920, the Acting Attorney General 
issued an opinion similar to the new position of the Army JAG.363  Squier thereafter 
sued AT&T for infringement.364  Writing for the court, Judge Knox expressed 
skepticism about the 1883 Act interpretations of the Army JAG and Acting Attorney 
General.365  In doing so, he stated his belief that the Act should be interpreted on the 
plain reading of its language, especially in light of the Patent Office’s longstanding—
and apparently heretofore unchallenged—practice of stamping “Dedicated to the 
Public” legends on every patent issued under the 1883 Act.366  Ultimately, however, 
Judge Knox did not decide the case based on this, but rather on Squier’s repeated 
and painfully clear public statements that he had dedicated use of the invention to 
the entire public, including AT&T.367  This effectively acted as an abandonment of his 
rights.368  Notwithstanding the outcome, the case signaled a growing concern among 
                                                                                                                                                
358 Id. at 748. 
359 Id. at 748.  The Army JAG opinion upon which Major Squier relied read: 
The patent, if issued, will vest the property rights in Maj. Squier; but the final 
clause of the above-cited act is to defeat any property rights in the patent within 
the territorial limits and jurisdiction of the United States, as such rights are 
prevented from accruing in Maj. Squier’s behalf, in the operation of the last clause 
of the statute.  It is therefore recommended that Maj. Squier be authorized to 
apply for a patent in the operation of the Act of March 3, 1883, as it is the 
operation of that act to throw it open to public and private use in the United 
States . . . .  
Id. 
360 Id. at 749. 




365 Id. at 752. 
366 Id. 
367 Id. at 752–53. 
368 Id. at 753. 
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government inventors that their magnanimous and public-spirited gestures of 
“dedicating to the public” their inventions should not then accrue to the profit of 
private businesses.  In other words, this demonstrated the emergence of a desire to 
separate commercial and noncommercial uses of federally funded inventions. 
In 1928, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a lower court 
holding that a government employee had been specifically hired to invent and 
assigning title to the government in Houghton v. United States.369  In so doing, the 
court seemed to broaden the hired-to-invent rule from earlier cases by stating that: 
[t]he right of the employer to the invention or discovery of the employee 
depends, not upon the terms of the original contract of hiring, but upon the 
nature of the service in which the employee is engaged at the time he makes 
the discovery or invention, and arises, not out of the terms of the contract of 
hiring, but out of the duty which the employee owes to his employer with 
respect to the service in which he is engaged.370 
At the same time, the court made it clear these were special facts because the 
employee initially had an ordinary position, but was later asked to work on a special 
project to invent and was expressly paid solely to produce the invention.371  But, the 
case also signaled a shifting sentiment in the courts that inventions paid for by the 
government and its taxpayers should be freely available to all:  
 
It is unthinkable that, where a valuable instrument in the war against disease 
is developed by a public agency through the use of public funds, the public 
servants employed in its production should be allowed to monopolize it for 
private gain and levy a tribute upon the public which has paid for its production, 
upon merely granting a nonexclusive license [to the government].372 
 
That same year, the 1883 Act was amended to change the troubled proviso.373  
The new language read:  “Provided, That the applicant in his application shall state 
that the invention described therein, if patented, may be manufactured and used by 
or for the Government for governmental purposes without the payment to him of any 
royalty thereon, which stipulation shall be included in the patent.”374  This evinced 
Congress’s clear intent that the Act was to provide a license to the government and 
its contractors only and not a public dedication, which would undercut the whole 
premise of a patent.  At the same time, the shop rights rule was already granting 
equitable licenses to the government for employee inventions, and in some cases, the 
hired-to-invent exception was being applied to transfer title entirely to the 
government.375  So, the only real benefit of the statute, as amended, would be for 
inventions developed by government employees on their own time.  But, the language 
                                                                                                                                                
369 Houghton v. United States, 23 F.2d 386, 391 (1928). 
370 Id. at 390. 
371 Id. 
372 Id. at 391. 
373 Act of April 30, 1928, ch. 460, 45 Stat. 467. 
374 Id., 45 Stat. at 468. 
375 E.g., Squier v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. 784 F.2d 747, 750–51 (1924). 
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was not retroactive, and a subsequent case found that patents issued under the 
original 1883 Act were still subject to the interpretation that they were dedicated to 
the public.376 
Also in 1928, the Supreme Court upheld the amended Government Use Statute 
in Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States.377  In that case, the Court reaffirmed 
that the sole remedy for patent owners in matters of infringement by the federal 
government or its contractors was to seek compensation under the Government Use 
Statute in the Court of Claims.378  Two caveats from earlier cases still seemed to 
apply, however.  First, the government must specifically authorize contractors to 
practice the patented invention in question and consent to such use (and its 
subsequent liability for compensation).379  Second, the statute would not apply where 
a contractor still had a negotiated licensing agreement with the patent owner.380  
Accordingly, this meant that the government and its contractors would be bound to 
any licenses to which the contractor was a party before or during the federal contract 
work.  
Meanwhile, the government had already begun studying the nature of patents 
arising under government service.  As early as 1919 and 1920, a bill was sponsored 
by the Interior Department to provide for voluntary assignment or license of patents 
by any government employee to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).381  The FTC 
could then license the patents to manufacturers, with any resultant license fees paid 
into the Treasury, and whatever portion might be deemed equitable paid to the 
inventor.382  The bill failed to pass Congress.383 
In 1923, an ad hoc interdepartmental patents board, created by executive order, 
recommended regulations establishing that, in the absence of a contract to the 
contrary, government employees retain ownership of their inventions.384  The 
rationale was that a dedication to the public would defeat the purpose and incentive 
of a patent.385  It also strongly rejected proposals that government employees be 
required to assign their inventions to the government, on the basis that it would be 
very difficult to attract and retain talented individuals to the already low-paying 
government positions.386  Finally, the board recommended legislation to establish a 
permanent board with the power to demand assignment of government employee 
patents where the inventions were related to national defense or were otherwise in 
the public interest.387  Its power to demand such assignments would be founded on a 
different part of the legislation that would make it an express term of government 
                                                                                                                                                
376 See, e.g., Selden Co. v. Nat’l Aniline & Chem. Co., 48 F.2d 270, 271 (W.D.N.Y. 1930). 
377 275 U.S. 331,346 (1928). 
378 Id. at 306–08. 
379 Act of July 1. 1918, ch. 114, 40 Stat. 705 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2012)); supra 
text accompanying note 344; Wood v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 296 F. 718, 722 (1924).  
380 Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v Isherwood, 5 F.2d 924, 933–34 (4th Cir. 
1925). 
381 United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 205–06 (1933). 
382 Id. at 205. 
383 Id. at 206. 
384 Id. 
385 Id. 
386 See id. at 206–07. 
387 Id. at 207. 
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employment that any inventions would be subject to the board’s power in this 
regard.388  None of the recommendations were adopted.389  
Coincidentally, in some universities, faculty had begun assigning their 
inventions to the university as early as World War I.390  By the 1930s, a number of 
universities had adopted institutional patenting policies.391  Notwithstanding, the 
government had no uniform patent policy for intramural or extramural research, and 
most of its funded research was devoted to “agriculture and the development of land 
resources.”392 
In the absence of government-wide policies or regulations, some government 
departments had begun issuing regulations governing employee inventions.393  Thus, 
in the 1930 case of Selden Co. v. National Aniline & Chemical Co., the District Court 
for the Western District of New York upheld employee invention regulations of the 
Department of Agriculture as consistent with the 1883 Act and having the force of 
law.394  The pertinent regulation required employee inventions to be “patented in the 
name of the inventor without expense to him, in such a way as to allow any citizen of 
the United States to use the patented article or process without payment of 
royalties.”395  Because the case was decided after amendment of the 1883 Act, but the 
patents were filed before, the question was raised as to which interpretation of the 
Act would govern.396  The court held that the amendment was not retroactive.397  And 
while it inclined towards the dicta in Squier, that the Act granted free rights to the 
entire public,398 it focused its decision on the Department’s regulations and the 
practice of the Patent Office to mark patents issued under the 1883 Act as either 
                                                                                                                                                
388 Id. 
389 Id. 
390 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 1,212,945 to Thomas P. Haslam in 1917 (assigned to Kansas 
Agricultural College); U.S. Patent No. 1,218,472 to T. Brailsford Robertsonin in 1917 (assigned to 
University of California, by agreement); U.S. Patent No. 1,392,767 to Edward C. Kendall in 1921 
(assigned to University of Minnesota); and U.S. Patent No. 1,491,900 to Daniel G. Chilson in 1924 
(assigned to University of Arizona). The Author thanks Gregg Graff for these citations. 
391 Archie MacInnes Palmer, University Patent Policies, 16 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 96 (1934) (noting 
that, among others, Colombia University, St. Louis University, and the University of Illinois had 
patent policies in place by the early 1930’s). 
392 BIDDLE REPORT, supra note 270, at 13 (noting that, prior to World War II, the major focus of 
government R&D was devoted to “agriculture and the development of land resources”). 
393 BIDDLE REPORT, supra note 270, at 22. The Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”) had a 
patent policy prescribed by Congress, in which the TVA retained sole and exclusive ownership of 
employee inventions.  Id.  The TVA obtained “ownership of all inventions which bear some relation 
to its functions, or involve the use of its time or facilities.”  Id.  Departments, including the Bureau 
of Standards, the Aeronautics Branch of the Department of Commerce, the Food and Drug 
Administration, and Department of Agriculture, among others, required assignment to the 
government of inventions made in the course of employee’s official duties.  Id. at 22–23. 
394 Selden Co. v. Nat’l Aniline Chem. Co., 48 F.2d 270, 273 (1930). 
395 Id. at 272. 
396 Id.  
397 Id. at 273. 
398 Squier v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 21 F.2d 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) aff’d 7 F.2d 831 (2d Cir 1925).  
The court in Squier noted that the plaintiff deliberately resorted to the 1883 Act because, under the 
Act, “it was intended that the free use of the invention, instead of being limited to the government 
and to persons engaged in work upon its behalf, should be open to any person in the United States 
who desired to take advantage of its disclosures.”  Id. at 753. 
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“Dedicated to the Public” or “Filed under the Act of Mar. 3, 1883.”399  It also 
considered the inventors’ own statements in a printed publication that the patents 
had been dedicated to the public under the 1883 Act and Department regulations.400  
Thus, the court held that the patents were abandoned by the inventors and dedicated 
to the public.401 
Then in 1933, the Supreme Court issued its landmark ruling, United States v. 
Dubilier Condenser Corp.402  Two employees in the radio division of the Bureau of 
Standards selected problems related to airplane radios that had been suggested by 
the Navy.403  They did not seek patents under the 1883 Act as amended, but rather 
filed as any ordinary citizen.404  They granted exclusive commercial licenses to 
Dubilier Condenser Corporation405 and a license to the government for governmental 
purposes.406  The government then sued Dubilier for a declaration that it was a 
trustee for the government and thus required to assign all its rights, title, and 
interest to the patents, as well as to make an accounting, to the government.407  The 
government may have thought it could tap into the apparent trend of courts 
broadening the hired-to-invent rule to allow a more general sense of hiring employees 
in an inventive capacity because it did not otherwise have a particularly compelling 
case.  No real evidence was proffered showing that the inventors were specifically 
hired or tasked to invent the devices they perfected and patented.408  It is also 
unclear why suit was brought against the exclusive licensee of the patents.  Even 
though, in some cases, exclusive licensees who have all rights of the patent can have 
standing to sue to enforce the patents, legal title is still held by the licensors.409 
Both lower courts and the Supreme Court ruled against the government.410  The 
Supreme Court may have taken the case in order to crop back the expanding scope of 
the hired-to-invent rule and/or to limit the growing sense in some courts and corners 
of the government that all inventions by government employees using government 
resources should be dedicated to the public.  This speculation may be supported by 
the exhaustive manner in which the majority reviewed every major angle and 
development in this area of law since Burn’s Case.411  Further, even the Court was 
divided, with three justices supporting the government’s position that the patents 
should be dedicated to the public, either through assignment to the government or by 
cancellation.412  Notwithstanding, the majority re-established the basic contours of 
                                                                                                                                                
399 Selden, 28 F.2d at 271–72. 
400 Id. at 274. 
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402 United States v. Dublilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933). 
403 Id. at 184–85. 
404 Id. at 203. 
405 Id. at 182. 
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407 Id. at 182. 
408 289 U.S. at 193. 
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[12:145 2012] Taking, Tort, or Crown Right?:  The Confused  195 
 Early History of Government Patent Policy 
 
the shop rights doctrine and its hired-to-invent exception, both for the private and 
public sectors. 
This remained the state of affairs into World War II.  But, the dramatic upswing 
in military manufactures needed during wartime meant that the federal government 
needed to be able to procure such manufactures through its contractors at much 
lower prices than it could have afforded during peacetime.413  Accordingly, Congress 
amended the Government Use Statute again to clarify these issues in the Royalty 
Adjustment Act in 1942.414  The amendment added language codifying the judicial 
requirement for clear “authorization and consent” by a federal agency for the 
contractor to use the specified patents or copyrights without authorization of the 
owner and still be covered by the statute.415  It also sought to clarify that contractors 
were not bound to existing licenses with patent owners while doing work for the 
federal government if the hiring agency incorporated clear authorization and consent 
language to use the patents in question independent of any license.416  This 
essentially overturned the result in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v 
Isherwood.417  Finally, the amendment served to settle any confusion in the courts as 
                                                                                                                                                
413 See, e.g., Adjusting Royalties for the Use of Inventions for the Benefit of the United States: 
Hearing on H.R. 7620 Before Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong. 3–4 (1942) (letter of Henry Stimson, 
Secretary of War) (presenting draft bill to adjust government patent royalties). 
414 Act of October 31, 1942, ch. 634 § 6, 56 Stat. 1013, 1014. The text of the amendment reads: 
For the purposes of this Act, the manufacture, use, sale, or other disposition of an 
invention, whether patented or unpatented, by a contractor, a subcontractor, or 
any person, firm, or corporation for the Government and with the authorization or 
consent of the Government shall be construed as manufacture, use, sale, or other 
disposition for the United States and for the purposes of the Act of June 25, 1910, 
as amended (40 Stat. 705; 35 U.S.C. § 68), the use or manufacture of an invention 
described in and covered by a patent of the United States by a contractor, a 
subcontractor, or any person, firm, or corporation for the Government and with 
the authorization or consent of the Government, shall be construed as use or 
manufacture for the United States. 
Id. 
415 Id. 
416 Adjusting Royalties for the Use of Inventions for the Benefit of the United States:  Hearing on 
H.R. 7620 Before Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong. 3–4 (1942) (letter of Henry Stimson, Secretary of 
War). Mr. Stimson wrote: 
In a number of instances, manufacturers with whom contracts for the production 
of articles and materials for the War Department have been placed were found to 
be manufacturing under licensing agreements entered into during peacetime with 
the owners of patents covering the desired articles or materials, binding such 
manufacturers to pay specified royalties. 
 
. . . . 
 
 The proposed legislation is designed to meet the existing situation and to aid in 
expediting production for the prosecution of war. 
Id.  
417 Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v Isherwood, 5 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1925) 
(holding that Government Use statute did not confine plaintiff to a claim against the U.S. 
government for government contractors use of plaintiffs patent to build ships pursuant to a 
government contract, and that plaintiff could pursue claim against contractor for patent 
infringement royalties).  
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to whether the Government Use Statute applied to federal subcontractors, as well as 
prime contractors, by explicitly adding them.418  The statute then remained 
unchanged until after World War II, when it was reworded and transferred out of 
Title 35 into Title 28, which covers the judiciary and judicial procedure.419  
Accordingly, by the end of World War II, the major contours of the first two 
categories of government patent policy were established.  First, inventions by 
government employees would be owned by the employee, except where there was a 
clear agreement that the employee was hired to invent that specific thing.  The 
government did not have an express license or shop right to use employee-owned 
inventions, even if they were developed with government resources.  But, it had a de 
facto right to use them because government employees were barred by the 
Government Use Statute from asserting claims against the government for such use, 
even if it was for patents the individual obtained before employment with the 
government.420  Second, the use of privately held patents, either directly by the 
government or on its behalf by contractors and subcontractors, was deemed a lawful 
appropriation or taking of a license as soon as the activity commenced.  The only 
recourse of the patent owner was to seek compensation from the Court of Claims.  
Notwithstanding this conceptual clarity, many cases continue to come through both 
the Court of Claims and district courts on various questions of jurisdiction, damages, 
etc.421  The third category—ownership and/or use rights to patented inventions of 
contractors (and their employees) developed under government contract—remained 
quite undeveloped, despite its rapid rise in the wartime and post-war research 
ecosystem. 
                                                                                                                                                
418 Act of October 31, 1942, ch. 634, § 6, 56 Stat. 1013, 1014. 
419 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1498, 62 Stat. 869, 941 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C 
§ 1498 (2012)). 
420 But see Van Meter v. United States, 47 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1931) (hearing an appeal from a 
district court decision in an infringement action against  the U.S. government permitted by a private 
act of Congress for an invention developed prior to government employment).  Interestingly, 
Congress was in some cases responsive to government employee inventor petitions for special 
private acts granting the employee a right to bring suit for compensation in district court (oddly, not 
in the Court of Claims).  
421 See, e.g., Broome v. Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co., 92 F.2d 886 (1937) (rejecting plaintiff patentee’s 
argument that use was actually by or for State of Ohio, and not federal government); Olsson v. 
United States, 25 F. Supp. 495 (1938) (guns purchased from France, assembled in United States, but 
then stored and unused, still constituted a “use” for purposes of Government Use Statute and 
compensation to patentee); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 108 F.2d 762 (1940) (infringing items 
made by private party for sale to government came within scope of Government Use Statute and so 
compensation could not be awarded by district court); Identification Devices v. United States, 121 
F.2d 895 (1941) (jurisdiction in district court is proper where claim is against private party for use 
on behalf of government, but a rejection of a claim in Court of Claims directly against the 
government does not give grounds for bringing the case in district court later; not all alleged harm is 
compensable); Yassin v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 509 (1948) (neither the Lend-Lease Act nor the 
Royalty Adjustment Act enlarged the scope of the Court of Claims jurisdiction under the 
Government Use Statute); Irving Air Chute Co. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 633 (1950) (six year 
statute of limitation not an issue where infringement is ongoing; each new act accrues a new cause 
of action).  
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III. POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN GOVERNMENT PATENT POLICY 
President Franklin Roosevelt had desired to establish a uniform government-
wide patent policy for both government employees and contractors.422  In 1943, at the 
height of World War II, he requested that the Attorney General undertake a 
comprehensive investigation of the nature and extent of government patent 
policies.423  The request anticipated the significant boom in post-war research funded 
by the government and sought to answer a single question:  “What disposition of 
patent rights as between the Government, its employee or contractor, and what use 
of patent rights owned by the Government, will best serve the public welfare and 
stimulate the progress of science and the useful arts?”424  A year later, President 
Roosevelt issued an executive order to create a separate register in the Patent Office 
to record all government rights in patents.425 
In 1947, the Department of Justice issued the Biddle Report in three volumes 
under the title “Investigation of Government Patent Practices and Policies, Report 
and Recommendations of the Attorney General to the President.”426  This report set 
the stage for nearly all of the current debates and policies regarding both intramural 
and extramural research patent policies.  The Biddle Report was heavily biased 
towards the position that federally funded inventions should be freely available to 
the public.427  It also frequently incorporated what were essentially opinions or 
recommendations into its “findings.”  For example, a central finding of the Biddle 
Report was that, with regard to inventions made by federal employees, “[i]nventions 
financed with public funds should inure to the benefit of the public, and should not 
become a purely private monopoly under which the public may be charged for, or 
even denied, the use of technology which it has financed.”428 
A further finding was that the government should obtain all rights to inventions 
made by government employees:  “(i) during working hours; or (ii) with a substantial 
contribution by the government (in the form of facilities, equipment, materials, funds 
or information, time paid for by the Government, or services of other government 
personnel), or (iii) bearing a direct relation to the employee’s official functions.”429  In 
cases where there was a less significant contribution by the government or a minor 
relationship between the invention and the employee’s official functions, the Biddle 
                                                                                                                                                
422 BIDDLE REPORT, supra note 270, at 9.  
423 Id. 
424 Id. at 2 
425 Exec. Order No. 9424, 9 Fed. Reg. 51 (Feb. 18, 1944). 
426 BIDDLE REPORT, supra note 270, at 1.  
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Federal participation in postwar research will be large and of major significance.  
The fruits of this great national resource are advances in science and technology, 
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of patent rights. 
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Report found that ownership should be left with the employee,430 subject to some 
important caveats.  First, the government should retain a perpetual, nonexclusive, 
irrevocable, royalty-free license to make, have made, use, and dispose of the 
invention.431  Second, the employee should have an obligation to exploit the invention 
diligently him or herself or grant nonexclusive licenses at a reasonable royalty to all 
applicants.432  In all other cases, the Biddle Report recommended that all rights 
should be left to the employee.433  In essence, the Biddle Report was recommending 
the adoption of an aggressive form of the shop rights doctrine.  President Truman 
implemented these recommendations in Executive Order 10096 in 1950, which is still 
in force, as amended.434 
The Biddle Report also found that the “public interest” required that patents 
arising from federally funded research and development (“R&D”) be assigned to the 
government: 
Public control will assure free and equal availability of the inventions to 
American industry and science; will eliminate any competitive advantage to 
the contractor chosen to perform the research work; will avoid undue 
concentration of economic power in the hands of a few large corporations; 
will tend to increase and diversify available research facilities within the 
United States to the advantage of the Government and of the national 
economy; and will thus strengthen our American system of free, competitive 
enterprise.435  
Further, leaving patent rights with the contractor might permit suppression of an 
invention paid for by the public or the imposition of charges for use by the public to 
private advantage.  This could “unbalance” federal research by making those 
programs, which were likely to lead to patents more desirable to contractors.436  
“Expert opinion and experience within and without the Government” was cited to 
support the contention that enough competent private and institutional labs would 
accept contracts specifying federal ownership of patentable invention arising from 
them.437  Nonetheless, the Biddle Report concluded that, in “emergency situations,” 
exceptions could be made to this basic policy for situations in which the contractor 
already had made a substantial independent contribution to the field of research.438  
                                                                                                                                                




434 “Providing for a Uniform Patent Policy for the Government With Respect to Inventions 
Made by Government Employees and for the Administration of Such Policy”, Exec. Order No. 
10,096,  15 Fed. Reg. 389–91 (Jan. 25, 1950) currently codified at 37 C.F.R. 501 (1996). The policy 
was challenged as unconstitutional in the 1970s and 1980s but survived. Heinemann v. United 
States, 796 F.2d 451 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding the Truman Order constitutional based on Executive 
powers and Congressional acquiescence for many years); Kaplan v. Corcoran, 545 F.2d 1073 (7th 
Cir. 1976) (same). 
435 BIDDLE REPORT, supra note 270, at 3. 
436 Id. at 2. 
437 Id. at 4. 
438 Id. 
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The Biddle Report then recommended a uniform patent policy in which all 
federal contracts for extramural R&D stipulate that the government would own any 
resultant patents.439  The head of each federal agency, however, could certify that an 
emergency existed and, with the approval of a central “Government Patents 
Administrator,” award a contract allowing the contractor to retain title to any patent 
inventions arising under it.  This could be done on terms and conditions that the 
Administrator would prescribe or approve and only so long as the contractor had 
already made a substantial independent contribution to the field.440  However, any 
such exceptional contract would be subject to the following conditions:  (i) The head of 
the agency and the Administrator would certify that reasonable efforts were made to 
find a contractor that would accept federal ownership of patents, but these efforts 
were unsuccessful; (ii) the contract would stipulate that the contractor would retain 
patent rights only to those inventions in which its independent contribution 
antedated the work called for in the contract; (iii) the contractor would grant the 
United States a nonexclusive, irrevocable, royalty-free license to make, have made, 
use and dispose of any inventions awarded to it under the contract; and (iv) the 
contractor (or its assignee) would agree to place the invention in adequate 
commercial use within a designated period, and if at the end of such time the 
government determined that such use was not being made, then the contractor (or its 
assignee) would be required to offer nonexclusive licenses at a reasonable royalty to 
all applicants.441  
The recommended requirements presaged the “Government License” and 
“March-in Rights” developed in President Kennedy’s Patent Policy,442 and later 
codified in the Bayh-Dole Act.443  It also established the terminology and basic two 
types of “title” and “license” patent policy models.444  In a “title” model, the 
government would take title to the inventions.445  In a “license” model, the contractor 
would retain title, but grant the government a nonexclusive license.446  At the same 
time, the Biddle Report also clearly distinguished among the three types of federal 
funding agreements still used today—procurement contracts, grants, and cooperative 
research agreements—and recommended that all three be treated under the same 
basic policy and exceptions framework.447 
Another central finding of the Biddle Report was that a uniform, government-
wide patent policy was indeed warranted and that it would “extend to all Federal 
agencies the benefits of sound patent principles, will avoid competition among the 
agencies, and will strengthen the Government’s bargaining position.”448  Exceptions 
to the basic policy, if any, should also be governed by uniform principles and 
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governed by the proposed Government Patents Administrator, to avoid conflict and 
breakdown of the basic policy.449  The Biddle Report also concluded that, because the 
policy governed only employment and contracting within the Executive Branch, it 
could be effected through an executive order and then implemented by departmental 
regulations.450  It would not alter or conflict with the existing patent laws or 
system.451  The Biddle Report recommended that the proposed Government Patents 
Administration should include both the Government Patents Administrator and an 
oversight body named the “Advisory Patents Board.”452 
The Biddle Report contained other findings and recommendations that are less 
relevant to the legal focus of this Article, but still notable for current patent policy 
debates.  First, it found that systems of special financial rewards, promotions, or 
salary increases based on development of patentable inventions could be 
“undesirable” because they “might induce secrecy and lack of cooperativeness.”453  
They could also pose administrative challenges in selecting the persons to be 
rewarded, especially where the invention was the result of a group effort, and create 
dissatisfaction among those not rewarded (even though they had done equally 
worthwhile, but unpatentable work), possibly resulting in the slighting of work not 
leading to patentable inventions.454  The Biddle Report recommended that any 
rewards systems treat patentable and unpatentable research results equally.455 
Second, it found that federally-owned inventions would best serve the public 
interest by being made available to all on a “royalty-free, nonexclusive” basis.456  If 
further risky development were needed so that private firms could market the 
invention, then the government should finance such development.457  
Notwithstanding, it still found that patenting of such inventions was superior to 
simply dedicating the inventions to the public because patenting would afford greater 
protection and control of the invention for the public interest.458 
Accordingly, the Biddle Report recommended that:  (i) All federally-owned 
inventions “should be made fully, freely, and unconditionally available to the public 
without charge, by public dedication or by royalty-free, nonexclusive licensing[;]” (ii) 
as soon as any such inventions were completed they should be patented or published 
(with full disclosure to the Patent Office to count as prior art to prevent others from 
patenting the invention); (iii) all federally-owned inventions should be listed and 
promoted in the register created under the Roosevelt Administration, with copies 
distributed widely; (iv) to the extent funds were available, projects should be initiated 
to demonstrate and publicize promising federally-owned inventions, especially to 
small businesses; (v) the Government Patents Administrator or other federal agency 
could recommend preliminary experimental, developmental, or pilot-plant operations 
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to establish the practicality or effectiveness of a particular federally-owned invention; 
and (vi) “[t]he Government Patents Administrator should prepare and submit to the 
President for approval a program to encourage and sponsor the use and practice of 
Government-owned inventions by small and new business concerns, and should 
report periodically on the extent of use of Government-owned inventions.”459 
Third, it recommended that the government should obtain foreign rights similar 
to whatever rights it had in the United States to any federally-funded invention.460  If 
the government later determined that it did not need such foreign rights, then it 
could release them back to the employee or contractor.461  President Truman issued 
an Executive Order implementing this recommendation that same year.462  It 
appears to be the first uniform directive to apply to all departments and agencies 
regarding patent rights arising from both intramural and extramural research 
funding. 
Fourth and finally, the Biddle Report recommended that: 
[Government] [e]mployees and contractors . . . be required to agree, in 
respect of any inventions made by them which the Government determines 
should be kept secret, that they will not disclose the invention to any 
unauthorized person, or assign any rights therein, or file any domestic or 
foreign patent applications, unless and until authorized to do so by the 
Government.463 
Despite the quick implementation of some of the Biddle Report’s 
recommendations by the Truman Administration, none of the others were acted on 
throughout the 1950s.  During that time, however, a number of statutes were passed 
that specifically allocated patents arising from federally-funded extramural research 
to either the government or contractors.464  A number of these were true “vesting 
statutes” in which the normal default rule of inventor ownership was trumped in 
favor of title allocation to a government entity.465  In the absence of a uniform 
government-wide patent policy, the various agencies went their separate ways with 
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different title or license policies for patents arising from extramural federally funded 
research.466 
It was not until the Kennedy Administration that a uniform, government-wide 
policy governing extramural research inventions was established (the “Kennedy 
Patent Policy”).467  The Kennedy Patent Policy established nearly all the key concepts 
and terminology of the modern government R&D procurement and technology 
transfer system established under the Bayh-Dole Act (albeit with many of them 
adapted from the Biddle Report).468  In particular, the core elements of the 
Government License and March-In Rights were in place.469  The Kennedy Patent 
Policy also included detailed requirements for contractors who acquired exclusive 
patent rights.470  For example, the contractor would have to submit periodic written 
reports to the funding agency regarding progress on commercialization of the 
invention.471  In cases where the federal agency retained the patent rights, the 
Kennedy Patent Policy imposed some conditions on the agency itself.  First, if the 
funding agency chose not to file for foreign patents, the contractor would be able to 
file for that patent subject only to a non-exclusive license to the government for 
governmental purposes and on behalf of any foreign government that would get such 
rights under a treaty or agreement with the United States.472 
The key divergence of the Kennedy Patent Policy from the Biddle Report was 
that the former sought to establish a balance between government and contractor 
ownership of patents arising from federally funded research:  “[T]he public interest 
might also be served by according exclusive commercial rights to the contractor in 
situations where the contractor has an established non-governmental commercial 
position . . . .”473  By contrast, the Biddle Report strongly urged government 
ownership and/or public dedication of federally funded inventions.  Under the 
Kennedy Patent Policy, funding agencies should consider whether inventions arising 
under federal funding agreements could productively be practiced directly by the 
public (e.g., a farming technique), or whether intervening R&D and private initiative 
was needed to turn the invention into a product that could be made available to the 
public (e.g., a complex manufactured device).474  The Kennedy Patent Policy seemed 
primarily focused on private sector contractors, rather than university and nonprofit 
research organization contractors:  Contractors who retained title or exclusive rights 
must bring those inventions to “the point of practical application,” defined as “to 
manufacture in the case of a composition or product, to practice in the case of a 
process, or to operate in the case of a machine and under such conditions as to 
establish that the invention is being worked and that its benefits are reasonably 
accessible to the public.”475 
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Notwithstanding the soundness of the Kennedy Patent Policy, it was never 
adopted as a government-wide regulation.  This was likely because of the myriad 
special title allocation statutes that Congress had passed.  It was not until the 
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 that anything approaching a binding 
government-wide contractor patent policy was put into effect.   
CONCLUSION 
From the early days of the Republic, Congress and the federal courts grappled 
with the government’s rights to own or use patents it issued.  Courts rejected the 
British Crown Rights rule that allowed the sovereign to practice whatever patents it 
issued.  Instead, the federal government was conceptualized as a legal person on par 
with any other persons with regard to issued patents.  But, this simple rule 
presented challenges as complexities arose in three intertwined patent rights 
scenarios.  The first involved inventions by government employees.  The second 
revolved around government and government contractor use of patents held by 
private citizens.  And the third involved inventions by federal contractors, and their 
employees, arising under federal funding.  While these three scenarios seem quite 
distinct today, this Article revealed the convoluted nineteenth and early-twentieth 
century case law that often treated them as overlapping.  The confusion was not fully 
resolved until the mid-twentieth century.  At that time, a combination of executive 
branch policy, Congressional legislation, and judicial developments set the roots of 
current government patent policy. 
Notwithstanding the clarity that has come from disentangling these three 
different scenarios, fundamental issues remain.  First, the indirect endorsement of 
eminent domain takings of licenses to privately held patents under the Government 
Use Statute still does not eliminate the questions of how this squares with the early 
Supreme Court cases rejecting any kind of Crown Right in the United States, and 
whether the government’s eminent domain powers with regard to patents are limited 
to those covered by the Statute.  This has been underscored by the multiple cases and 
appeals in Zoltek Corp. v. United States.476  At the heart of those cases has been 
confusion over whether the Government Use Statute applies to the infringement of a 
patented process by or on behalf of the government where the alleged infringement 
occurred, in part or in total, offshore.  If it does not, then another area to explore 
might be whether the patentee has any takings claim under the Tucker Act.477  Or is 
the patentee out of luck just like the pre-Government Use Statute patentees who 
could not show any kind of express or implied contract with the government?  The 
latest opinion from Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit seems to resolve these 
questions by invoking the direct infringement liability of a party who imports a 
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manufacture produced overseas by a process patented in the United States.478  This 
may then bring the complaint back within the scope of the Government Use Statute 
and head off any attempts to rely on the Tucker Act for a general takings claim. 
Second, the question of whether Bayh-Dole had allocated title to federally 
funded inventions as between contractors and their employees was never directly 
addressed before Stanford v. Roche.479  While regulations before and after the 
passage of Bayh-Dole seemed to make clear that contractors had the obligation to 
secure adequate rights from their inventive employees to protect the government’s 
interests under funding agreements, this seems to have been lost in the mix 
somewhere.480  In its place was a vague sense, among university administration in 
particular, that Bayh-Dole had automatically transferred title from employee 
inventors to the contractor by operation of law.  In fact, Bayh-Dole simply regulated 
the relationship between the contractor and the government.481  Some had tried to 
treat contractors and their employees as if they were directly employed by the 
government.  But, the history belies this as a serious consideration.  In the end, as 
the Court in Stanford v. Roche had to concede, the question of title as between 
contractors and their employees was simply not addressed as a legislative matter, 
but rather left to the negotiation and private ordering of the parties.482  
 In sum then, the three categories of government patent policy are still works-in-
progress.  We have not resolved all the nuances and issues.  Nonetheless, significant 
progress has been made.  In some cases, the progress is simply greater clarity about 
the differences among the three categories and their subcategories.  In other cases, 
statutory, regulatory, or case law has established a working rule that advances 
equity among the government, its employees and contractors, and unaffiliated patent 
owners.  More work needs to be done as the United States continues to break new 
ground on a system that, at its core, treats the government itself as just another 
private citizen who must engage with other citizens regarding what it is doing and 
which rights it has. 
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